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Brief Timeline of Events: 
 
1940: 
- May 10: Germany invades the Netherlands, Belgium, and; Churchill replaces 
Chamberlain as British Prime Minister 
- May 13: German troops cross Meuse at Sedan 
- May 26: British Commander-in-Chief Gort decides to withdraw towards Channel 
- May 26-June 4: Dunkirk evacuation 
- June 5: Reynaud appoints De Gaulle as Undersecretary of State for National Defense and 
War, bringing the General into Reynaud’s Cabinet 
- June 5-7: German army breaks through Somme/Aisne line 
- June 14: German troops enter Paris; French government heads for Bordeaux 
- June 16: Reynaud resigns and Petain becomes premier 
- June 17: Petain’s radio speech announcing need for armistice 
- June 18: De Gaulle speaks on the BBC calling for a French resistance  
- June 22: Signature of Franco-German armistice 
- June 28: De Gaulle recognized by Britain as leader of Free France and as representative 
of French national interests; Free France established 
- July 1: French government, led by Pétain, moves to Vichy 
- July 3-4: British navy attacks the French fleet at Mers-el-Kébir 
- July 8: Vichy government cuts diplomatic relations with Britain 
- August 26-28: The “Three Glorious Days,” in which Chad, the Cameroons, and the 
Congo all shift their allegiance from Vichy to Free France 
- September 23-24: Britain and Free France launch Operation Menace, in which they 
attempt, and fail, to land at Dakar 
- October 27: Empire Defense Council established in Brazzaville, which organizes Free 
French rule, headed by Chadian Governor Félix Éboué, over French colonial holdings in 
Equatorial Africa 
- November 8: Gabon declares support for Free France, signifying that all of Equatorial 
Africa has declared for De Gaulle 
1941: 
- April 1: Coup d’état in Iraq led by Rashid Ali threatens British colonial rule in the Middle 
East 
- May 20-June 1: Battle of Crete results in an Axis victory in the Mediterranean 
- June 8: Britain and Free France launch Operation Exporter, an invasion of Syria and 
Lebanon 
- July 12: Henri Dentz, Vichy High Commissioner to the Levant, surrenders 
- July 14: Britain and Vichy sign the Saint Jean of Acre Armistice. The territory comes 
under British control 
- August: De Gaulle gives an interview in the Chicago Daily News 
- December 7: The United States enters the war following the attack on Pearl Harbor 
- December 24: Free France takes Saint-Pierre and Miquelon 
Key People: 
 
Admiral Darlan: Chief of Staff of the French Navy 
 
Admiral Gensoul: Leader of French forces in Mers-el-Kébir 
 
Admiral James Somerville: Commander of the British attack on Mers-el-Kébir 
 
Admiral John Cunningham: Commander of the British fleet during the attempted Dakar landings 
 
Anthony Eden: British Secretary of State for War until December 22, 1940. Replaces Halifax as  
 Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and serves in that post from December   
 1940 – 1945 
 
Edward Spears: Liaison between Britain and Free France. Works closely with De Gaulle and  
  Churchill 
 
General Sir Alan Brooke: Chief of the Imperial General Staff (Britain) 
 
General Georges Catroux: Former Governor of French Indochina; led Operation Exporter and  
          following the armistice became the High Commissioner to the Levant 
 
General Henri Dentz: French high commissioner, leader of M.E. troops (Vichy) 
 
Lord Halifax: Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from 1938 – December 1940 
 
Neville Chamberlain: Prime Minister of Britain until May 1940 
 
Paul Reynaud: President of France until June 1940 
 
Philippe Pétain: Head of the Vichy regime 
 
Oliver Lyttelton: A prominent British businessman and president of the British board of trade 
 
John Colville: A British civil servant and close friend of Churchill; known for his detailed diaries 
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Anglo-French relations have notoriously been complex and rooted in political and military 
clashes of interest. Historian Peter Mangold maintains that the roots of the tension date back to 
the Hundred Years’ War, the fourteenth-century conflict in which the British systematically 
ravaged the French countryside. These imperial conflicts continue to be present in the relations 
between France and Britain.1 They boiled over during the First World War. The Great War had 
neither created any lasting alliance between the two countries, nor had it broken down the 
historical distrust on either side; in fact, the anti-French feeling among British soldiers returning 
from the trenches “amounted almost to an obsession.” While the French played a leading role in 
post-war peace negotiations, its relationship with Britain was still “decidedly unequal.”2 The 
most significant repercussion from the First World War in terms of their relations actually 
occurred during the war. The Sykes-Picot agreement of 1915 divided part of the Ottoman 
Empire, where France gained control over Syria and Lebanon and Mesopotamia and Iraq went to 
Britain. In 1919, the Treaty of Versailles abrogated French control of Syria in favor of an Arab 
kingdom, which knocked France’s influence in the Middle East down and exacerbated the 
already-present rivalry in the region, which dated back to Napoleon. Ultimately, this alteration 
meant that Britain was more-or-less unilaterally making policy decisions that undermined France 
and relegated it to the status of a British satellite.3 
                                                        
1 A French note from 1890 said: “As always Britain is getting the lion’s share. Britain, the great insatiable 
Britain, not content with its Asiatic Indies, with its Dominion of Canada, with its Australian Empire, with 
its vast possessions in South and East Africa, wishes to snatch from us Central Sudan and dreams of 
establishing its economic supremacy not only northward from the Great Lakes to Egypt and southward to 
the Cape, but westward also to Timbuctoo.” 
2 Peter Mangold, Britain and the Defeated French: From Occupation to Liberation, 1940-1944 (New 
York: I.B. Tauris, 2012): 20. 
3 Mangold, Britain and the Defeated French, 21. 
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Because of the unequal power dynamics that defined much of Anglo-French relations for 
centuries, the French developed a sense of “Anglophobia.” Major General Spears, the British 
liaison to the Free French, claimed that the French “really disliked us more than I can find 
expression for” and that the British represented a “false friend.”4 These sentiments were 
enflamed by the fall of France in spring 1940. The Germans quickly and catastrophically 
defeated and occupied France. From the French perspective, the British played a role in their loss 
because, despite appealing to Britain for military support, they failed to commit the resources 
that could have saved France. Historian David Reynolds claims that they “were hardly a major 
asset” in terms of their military assistance. Britain provided only a third of its total serviceable 
aircraft to help the French and sent in only a handful of squadrons, paling in comparison behind 
the French, Belgians, and Dutch in terms of divisions sent to battle. While the British had a 
larger population than France and produced more than twice its manufacturing output, they held 
back in this crucial moment of 1940.5   
The defeat of France in the spring of 1940 had serious implications for the rest of the Second 
World War and on Franco-British relations. Reynolds, for one, argues that the fall of France was 
the “fulcrum of the Twentieth Century,” explaining that it altered European and even global 
power system. On one hand, the events of June 1940 did not have a unique impact on Britain’s 
relations with those who claimed to represent the “true France.”6 After all, they only exacerbated 
                                                        
4 Major General Spears, sound recording, Thames Television, 1972, Oral History 2714, Imperial War 
Museum, London. 
5 David Reynolds, “1940: Fulcrum of the Twentieth Century?” International Affairs. 66, no. 2 (April, 
1990): 325, 327, 328. Moments like Dunkirk cement this perspective as well. While the British can claim 
that that operation was a success, the French remember it as an act of betrayal and abandonment on the 
part of their ally. 
6 This phrasing is key because the Vichy government cut off diplomatic ties with Britain on July 8, 1940 
following the British attack on the French Navy at Mers-el-Kébir. Since Free France was not the 
legitimate political entity for Metropolitan France, it would be incorrect to refer to them as representatives 
of the French people. However, to maintain consistency in this section, it will be easier to conceptualize 
Free France, not Vichy, as continuing the political ideals set out by previous French republics.  
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the Anglophobic beliefs on the part of the French that had been in place for centuries. Likewise, 
France’s defeat proved in the eyes of the British that France was perhaps as weak as they had 
historically believed. Yet, France’s fall provided a major impetus for stopping Hitler’s expansion 
in ways that the occupations of other European countries, like Poland and Czechoslovakia, had 
failed to do. In this goal, the British and many French were united.  
When General Charles de Gaulle arrives in Britain in June 1940, he was a bit of a 
shipwrecked sailor, a man who had fled his country when he realized the government was going 
to seek a peace agreement with Germany. He was intent on resisting any sort of armistice, but 
had none of the manpower, money, or military equipment necessary to do so. De Gaulle 
recognizes in Prime Minister Winston Churchill a shared desire to stop the Germans and believes 
that a partnership with Britain would provide the support he needed to liberate his country. Yet, 
when De Gaulle and his organization called Free France, a sort of government-in-exile, team up 
with Churchill’s cabinet, the French General realizes that his war goals do not always perfectly 
overlap with those of Britain. The friction created by conflicting goals is further enflamed by the 
personal clashes between the two leaders each with a strong personality. Their partnership 
reveals the ways that personality and strategic interests worked together to impact the success of 
Allied military operations and on the struggle to defeat Hitler. 
This thesis begins with an overview of the events of spring 1940 that led to and followed the 
Fall of France. In doing so, it explains the foundation of De Gaulle’s relationship with Churchill 
and Britain, as well as the beginnings of Free France. This sheds light on the strategic interests of 
Britain and Free France. Chapter two provides an analysis of each leader’s personality. Through 
primary source analysis of individuals close to De Gaulle and Churchill, that section illustrates 
perceptions of each leader’s personalities. The remaining three chapters marry these two ideas – 
strategy and personality – and use them to analyze three major events between 1940 and 1941.  
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The first, Mers-el-Kébir, was the British decision to sink the French fleet in North Africa. 
This chapter reveals how, even though De Gaulle and Churchill had the same end goal – 
ensuring that Germany could not make use of the French navy – they had conflicting ideas of 
how to achieve it. More importantly, the fact that De Gaulle did not participate in the planning 
process highlights the subordinate role he played vis-à-vis the British, a reality he refused to 
accept.  
A few months later in Africa, De Gaulle does help coordinate the plans to land at Dakar 
in French West Africa. Yet, the tactical fiasco of that event was a setback for Free France’s and 
Britain’s military goals. The British press blamed De Gaulle for the failure, pointing to his 
personality flaws, not the plan itself, as the cause. Following Dakar, De Gaulle remained in 
Equatorial Africa. He successfully rallied the region and established a territorial foothold in 
which Free France could base its operations. No longer under Britain’s thumb, and having finally 
achieved important military victories, De Gaulle could move forward with his plan to liberate 
France.  
In the final chapter, De Gaulle returns to London and helps plan an invasion of Vichy-
controlled Syria and Lebanon. While the mission was a military success, the armistice which 
followed was a diplomatic disaster for the General. This campaign was a live grenade in the 
relationship between Churchill and De Gaulle. For De Gaulle, it invoked the long history of 
British conquest over French territories and enflamed anti-British sentiments. It was yet another 
moment when Britain was triumphant over France. From Churchill’s view, the Levant incident 
showed that De Gaulle was only interested in rebuilding the French empire under his power. It 
seemed uncertain how committed to the Allied cause De Gaulle really was. The aftermath of the 
Levant represented a major shift in Britain’s relationship with Free France, in that neither De 
Gaulle nor Churchill trusted the other to defend the same goals. 
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This thesis ends in 1941 because, while the Levant was a significant breaking point 
between Churchill and De Gaulle, their dynamic completely changes when the United States 
enters the war in December of that year. Roosevelt found De Gaulle impossible to work with and 
also did not support his leadership in a post-war France. De Gaulle wanted to make France a 
great power again, whereas Roosevelt believed their defeat in June 1940 meant they were no 
longer entitled to that status. Moreover, Churchill relies on US military and economic support; in 
this sense, he spends a lot of time after 1941 trying to balance his relationship with both 
Roosevelt and De Gaulle. While Churchill was the primary decision-maker before the US joins 
the war, Roosevelt replaces him, limiting the support the Allies give to De Gaulle. Ultimately, 
the British and Free French make significant gains between 1940-1941, but in the context of 




























Chapter 1 – The Fall of France: 
Following the success the German military found in Poland in September 1939, Hitler 
wanted to maintain this momentum and take advantage of a disorganized and scared France; that 
is, Hitler wanted to rush into Germany’s western neighbor before the French could arm 
themselves. Unfortunately for Germany, these original attack plans were obtained by Belgium; 
this error left Hitler no choice but to abandon the plan until a later date. In the meantime, the 
Germans turned towards northern Europe. In April 1940, German forces entered Denmark and 
after just a few hours, the Danish government surrendered. In Norway, Germany faced a heartier 
resistance, but succeeded nevertheless. This victory was particularly important because it 
allowed Germany to use the Norwegian coast and helped prevent an Allied blockade of the 
North Sea. With much of northern and eastern Europe under their control, the Germans saw the 
opportunity to turn their attention to the west.  
On May 10, German troops invaded the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, which 
launched their offensive in the west. On the same day, Winston Churchill replaced Neville 
Chamberlain as Prime Minister. He represented the wing of the British elite that was most 
determined to resist German expansionism.1 The Netherlands quickly surrendered on May 14, 
and Belgium followed suit on May 28; France was the next target. This created chaos, 
uncertainty, and fear in both the British and French governments; Britain knew that if France 
fell, its own security would be greatly threatened. Anthony Eden, the British Secretary of State 
for War, remarked in his memoirs that his waking hours “were entirely occupied with the details 
of the struggle raging in France.” The War Cabinet in London sometimes met two or three times 
                                                        
1 Andrew N. Buchanan, World at War: A Global History of World War II, 1931–1953,  
Forthcoming, 2018, 82. 
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a day. An entry from Eden’s memoirs on May 19, 1940 reflects the dismal outlook the British 
held vis-à-vis the situation in Europe:  
[Chief of the Imperial General Staff] Ironside said to me: ‘This is the end of the British Empire.’ 
He spoke the words flatly and as a mere statement of military fact. He did not believe that we 
could hold out alone for more than a few months. I argued against this, but more from instinct 
than from reason; militarily I did not see how he could be gainsaid. 
Eden also recollected a telephone call from Commander-in-Chief Gort’s aide-de-camp, Lord 
Munster, reports that “All the lines of communication of the B.E.F [British Expeditionary 
Forces] were cut. There was a serious shortage of food and munitions. Above all, there was no 
coordination between ourselves and the French on the right flank.”2 Eden described Munster’s 
message as “a deadly commentary on the increasing confusion which we had neither the 
authority nor the reserves to mend.”3  
On May 21, Paul Reynaud admitted that “the homeland is in danger” in a speech in 
which he discussed French mistakes and the country’s lack of preparation for war. On the 
civilian side, the general French population did not understand what was happening. French 
author Robert de Saint Jean remarked that “the serenity of Paris…is astonishing” since war panic 
had not really affected rank-and-file Parisians until the Germans approached Paris in June. Only 
journalists, war relief workers, and politicians were aware of the seriousness of the situation.4  
French military leaders anticipated that Germany would attack them from the north (since 
the Maginot Line to the east prevented the Germans from easily crossing the border), so they 
                                                        
2 Anthony Eden, The Memoires of Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon: The Reckoning (Cambridge, MA: The 
Riverside Press Cambridge, 1965): 124; Herbert R. Lottman, The Fall of Paris: June 1940 (New York: 
HarperCollins, 1992): 111. 
3 Eden, The Memoires of Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon, 124. 
4 Lottman, The Fall of Paris, 96, 99, 67. 
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planned to push deeper into Belgium and fight the Germans there. 5 German planners, 
specifically General Erich von Manstein, reformulated their attack to account for French 
strategy. Instead of advancing straight through France from the northern border, they planned to 
cut west towards the Channel, hoping to cut off French troops heading to Belgium. French and 
British planners believed that this was a mistake on the part of the Germans; in order to make it 
to the French coast, German troops would have to cut through the dense Ardennes forest and 
cross several major rivers that they believed would be impossible, or at the very least would slow 
the Germans down enough to catch up to them.  
Under Churchill’s new leadership, and in light of the struggle its allies felt in mainland 
Europe, Britain sent forces to France for support. The British and French forces combined had 
fifteen- to twenty-thousand troops and Germany had about the same; however, Germany had far 
superior airpower and more tanks. Unexpectedly, the Germans emerged from the forest quickly 
and successfully, establishing the “Panzer Corridor.” According to Sir John Dill, the Vice Chief 
of the Imperial General Staff, “there was nothing much left for the French High Command to do 
but wait to see how the battle turned;” moreover, the main enemy was the tank and all British 
resources, including air, should “be devoted to its destruction.”6 On May 20, German forces 
reached the Channel, isolating Britain’s and France’s best troops in Belgium and leaving the rest 
of France wide open for their advance. German blitzkrieg tactics gave them the “aura of 
invincibility” to the British and French, which broke their morale and began the unraveling of 
their relations.7  
                                                        
5 The Maginot Line was a concrete barrier built in the 1930s specifically intended to deter a German 
invasion across the French border. It did not extend across France’s border with Belgium and up to the 
British Channel. 
6 Eden, The Memoires of Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon, 121-2, 131, 123-24. 
7 Buchanan, World at War, 87. 
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The chaos of April and early May for Britain and France was compounded at the end of 
May by the evacuation of Dunkirk, known as Operation Dynamo. Historian Julian Jackson 
writes that this event further “fuel[ed] the flames of Franco-British animosity.”8 Under the 
pressure of the increasing German threat, Britain decided to evacuate its troops from Dunkirk, a 
French port on the English Channel. The Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary 
Forces made the unilateral decision to ignore orders from the British Government for a 
Southward attack to support the French Army, instead ordering a retreat by the BEF Northwards 
to the French coast. In doing so, the British forces did not form the final rearguard for the French 
as they were supposed to, which left the French forces vulnerable to German attacks.  
At the end of Operation Dynamo, over 338,000 forces were evacuated between May 25-
June 4, 1940. 198,000 of those were British and 140,000 were other Allied troops, mostly 
French.9 From the French perspective, Dunkirk fostered a sense of betrayal because the British 
saved the BEF first while abandoning France. More British than French soldiers had been saved 
and the French felt that Churchill’s promises to protect France had not been fulfilled by the 
British forces on the ground. At the same time, the British felt that the French had delayed too 
long in preparing their troops for evacuation; in other words, the British blamed the French for 
their own losses. Thus, Dynamo was for the British a “victory snatched from the jaws of defeat,” 
while, for the French, it was “only another step on the road to catastrophe.”10 
The French Response 
As British troops sailed home, panic replaced confusion as the Germans penetrated 
France more quickly than anticipated, and the French became acutely aware of the incoming 
                                                        
8 Julian Jackson, The Fall of France: The Nazi Invasion of 1940 (Oxford: Oxford University  
Press, 2003): 94. 
9 Jackson, The Fall of France, 95; Buchanan, World at War, 87. 
10 Jackson, The Fall of France, 97. 
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threat to their survival. French writer Pierre Drieu la Rochelle commented on the French defeat 
that he “didn’t think it could happen so quickly.” Meanwhile, Life magazine correspondent Clare 
Booth noted that “The Germans were hardly seventy miles from Paris…And fear gripped every 
heart.” She also detailed her interaction with a French Red Cross nurse, who spoke of the 
situation as a betrayal. It was the first time Boothe remembered the invasion being described this 
way. With the spread of information came panic; Boothe noted that “Paris got its information 
about what France had been doing all day, all night, the way a woman gets hers about what her 
husband has been up to.”11 In other words, Parisians received piecemeal updates, strung together 
not by the words but the unconcealable gestures and expressions of political figures.  
A sense of hopelessness emerged among both civilians and politicians in France. French 
officers reportedly abandoned their men because “it was better to let the enemy take as few 
prisoners as possible.” Moreover, the US Ambassador to France, William Bullit, wrote that 
“unless God grants a miracle as at the time of the Battle of the Marne, the French army will be 
crushed utterly.” He further stated that “as the suffering grows, a certain amount of bitterness is 
inevitable” and that the cries from the French were for planes, of which neither the British nor 
the Americans were providing enough. In one account between General Gamelin and Churchill, 
when Churchill asked where France’s strategic reserves were positioned and Gamelin replied 
“there aren’t any,” indicating the British government’s ignorance of just how badly France had 
been wounded. Another Red Cross representative, Wayne Taylor, stated that German barbarity 
and French suffering were “ten times more horrible” than Ambassador Bullit was reporting, and 
that the heavy losses would continue.12 
                                                        
11 Lottman, The Fall of Paris, 69, 77, 78. 
12 Lottman, The Fall of Paris, 56, 61-2, 102, 65 93, 110.  
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As German troops approached Paris in the first few weeks of June, the French debated 
moving the government somewhere safer. Government ministries burned all their archives, 
indicating that the evacuation of Paris was a real possibility. Public buses in Paris were 
requisitioned to transport refugees, but also carried government personnel out of the capital. 
Senior French government officials recognized that maintaining morale and order in Paris was a 
priority, so new efforts began to instill hope in their people. One of Reynaud’s cabinet members 
stated that “to evacuate Paris was to abandon the fight, as well as to paralyze the rest of France.” 
Germaine Beaumont, a columnist for Le Matin, wrote:  
When one sees in the railway stations, out of danger certainly, but collapsing from exhaustion, 
weakened by horror and tears, old people, children, girls and women, and when one remembers 
that the Germans are machine-gunning this weakness and this despair point blank, one is so 
violently revolted that one knows quite well, at that instant, that Germany cannot win the war… 
If the men fall, women will take up arms, and if in turn the women fall, the very stones of the 
road will rise up as in legendary times.13 
These anecdotes reflect the French resolve to fight at all levels of society, but they also reveal 
stark divisions among the people and government officials over the best way to preserve French 
morale and stop the German advance. While everyone recognized the German actions were 
abhorrent, the ideas of an armistice and surrender were much more controversial.14 For example, 
Philippe Pétain, the “lion of Verdun” who went on to head the Vichy regime, called the early 
                                                        
13 Lottman, The Fall of Paris, 65, 68, 108-9, 58, 111. 
14 At the beginning, Eden and Churchill shared the opinion that the best solution to the turmoil was to 
have Reynaud make way for a figure like Pétain, who would call for an armistice. While they supported 
the armistice with Germany, it was not to say that the British supported a peace treaty. The distinction 
rests on where the British hoped to continue fighting. In other words, an armistice with Germany would 
end the slaughter in France, but would allow the Allies to continue fighting in North Africa and elsewhere 
against Hitler’s regime, as well as preserve French military reserves. A peace treaty, of course, would 
remove that option. More specifically, Eden emphasizes the difference as being a military versus a 
political decision. He states that the British “could consent to France asking for the former [the armistice] 
under military duress. We could never agree to her making peace” (Italics in original). Eden, The 
Memoires of Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon, 136.   
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Anglo-French union as “a marriage with a corpse,” and felt strongly that French interests had 
been pushed aside in order to preserve the alliance.15 
German forces continued to push deeper into France and, on June 14, occupied Paris. To 
the French, this defeat was a complete military and political disaster. French Historian Gloria 
Elizabeth Maguire argues that, from this moment, the French developed an inferiority complex 
that was maintained throughout the entire war. She says the following of this psychological 
development: 
Les Français nourrissaient depuis 1940 un complexe d’infériorité qui avait commencé avec la 
défaite militaire et qui avait grandi du fait de la résistance déterminée de la Grande-Bretagne – 
qu’ils souhaitaient voir réussir par-dessus tout mais qui avait comme effet de faire paraître plus 
abject encore l’armistice franco-allemand – et du fait de la supériorité écrasante des États-Unis 
dans les domaines économiques et militaire.16 
This underscores the existential crisis the French faced. They understood this defeat not only as a 
loss or an embarrassment, but also as a result of greater weaknesses in areas fundamental to a 
nation’s sovereignty.  
French Prime Minister Paul Reynaud refused to support a peace agreement with the 
German forces; he preferred to follow the Dutch example, wherein the army declared a ceasefire 
while the government went abroad to continue fighting. He was outnumbered in his Cabinet, the 
notable opposition voices coming from General Weygand, Admiral Darlan, Camille Chautemps, 
and Pétain himself.17 Reynaud resigned on June 16, just two days following the capture of Paris. 
For French President Albert Lebrun, Pétain was the obvious successor to Reynaud because, 
                                                        
15 Mangold, Britain and the Defeated French, 29. François Kersaudy, Churchill and De Gaulle (New 
York: Atheneum, 1982): 20. 
16 Gloria Elizabeth Maguire, “Notre mal de tête commun : Churchill, Roosevelt, et De Gaulle,” Revue 
d’histoire moderne et contemporaine. 42, no. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1995), 599. 
17 Jackson, The Fall of France, 136. 
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instead of continuing Reynaud’s ardent but ineffective resistance to the German regime, Pétain 
wanted to sign a peace deal. He agreed to an armistice with Germany on June 23, which allowed 
for the occupation of northern France and the Atlantic coast by the Germans. Pétain became the 
head of the zone libre (unoccupied zone) and the Vichy government. Lucien Neuwirth, who was 
sixteen in the spring of 1940, described the defeat as “une pâtée historique” and 
“incomprehensible” that an empire of 100 million, on which the sun never set, could lose in just 
six weeks. He recalled that Pétain’s declaration of an armistice was the first time in his life he 
had seen his mother cry.18  
Understanding Defeat 
In both the British and French governments, May and June 1940 represented calamity. 
Documents following the defeat offer three primary explanations: artillery weakness; 
incompetence of, and poor preparation by, the French High Command; and a divergence of 
public attitudes towards the war, specifically whether or not to resist the Germans. Anthony Eden 
recalls that “enemy air power soon dominated the battle in France,” indicating that the French 
lacked the number of planes – a new form of warfare technology – necessary to compete with 
German air strategy.19 Additionally, Captain E. Bauer wrote that the “famous French artillery, 
pride of the French Army, was rarely used with full effect” and that they had a shortage of anti-
tank weapons.20 Thus, their inability to combat the German tanks, which Eden and de Gaulle 
both saw as the main enemy, made the French army “doomed to failure.”21 
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Several memoirs blame the French military leadership for this catastrophic failure. On 
one hand, the French High Command was composed almost completely of old men who could 
not imagine war differently than it was during the First World War. On the other hand, their 
military strength during World War I also meant that they did not feel the need to update their 
strategy according to new warfare and technologies that had come out of the interwar period. De 
Gaulle wrote in his memoirs that he believed the Maginot line would act as a barrier behind 
which the “nation in arms” would wait for the blockade to wear the enemy down and the 
“pressure of the free world” to drive the Germans to surrender. He uniquely called for a more 
mobile weapons system, specifically with regard to tanks and planes.22 William Barkley, a 
British journalist during the war, also described the defeat as shocking in regard to the mental 
and military unpreparedness.23 As a result of their “utter incompetence” in this respect, new 
recruits had very little applicable training that would prepare them for the invasion of 1940.24 
British Colonel J.A. Watson reflects on a conversation with de Gaulle on the defeat, writing that 
the de Gaulle believed the French Generals, 
in spite of every effort of his and others to modernize their ideas, stuck (even after what they were 
bound to have seen during the Polish campaign) to the old idea of a line and reserves, the whole 
to be maintained unbroken as was done during the last years of World War I. The war of 
movement was a thing that they were totally unprepared for and it wrecked all their ideas…the 
fighting had not been commensurate with the means available.25  
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Between the lacking artillery capabilities and the deficient strategy, the French were ill-prepared 
to take on the Germans at this point in the war.  
Approaches to the war among the French exacerbated the extent of their defeat. In other 
words, the question of fighting back for many people came down to the desire to survive versus 
the preservation of their pride. In an article written in September 1940, Barkley argued that, 
while the French were eager to maintain their glorious national reputation, they were “little 
inclined to put forth the efforts necessary to perpetuate it.”26 He quotes British writer Alexander 
Werth that the Jacobin slogan “liberty or death” was replaced by the attitude that slavery under a 
German-occupied France would be more or less temporary and preferable to death. That is, while 
the French knew they would suffer if they surrendered, they would “preserve the seeds of 
survival in French youth;” they believed this was more important for restoring the greatness of 
their country.27 The French had lost the battle, but they would never win the war if they did not 
survive. De Gaulle staunchly disagreed with this mentality, believing that surrender was 
synonymous with defeat and even death. 
Most French accusations against the British in the wake of the fall of France concentrated 
on the issue of air support. Weygand and Reynaud repeatedly pressed the British to send more 
squadrons to France, but Churchill felt that this would compromise the defense of the British 
Isles.28 Many French officials condemned the British reluctance to send more troops to France, 
calling their ally “no help at all,” as well as “critical and contemptuous” of their struggle against 
the Germans.29 Churchill argued that he could not deprive his country of the planes necessary for 
their defense, so agreed only to send fourteen squadrons, leaving twenty-five – “an absolute 
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minimum” – on the ground in Britain.30 The French saw this as a sign of betrayal. Since 
Germany’s threat to Britain would worsen with the fall of France, given that the enemy’s 
proximity made it easier to attack across the Channel, it looked like the British were sacrificing 
France in order to prepare themselves for an attack; this reflected a “fear of suffocation” and the 
notion that the French might become “a British dominion.”31 According to historian Philippe 
Burrin, many in France seemed to feel that England failed to understand the gravity of France’s 
position and its “thirst for security”; they saw England as an ally “by necessity rather than 
affection.”32 
Of course, France’s defeat had serious implications for Britain, too. Peter Mangold 
argues that it represented “the worst crisis in modern British history” and a “military and 
strategic game changer.” France is Britain’s closest continental neighbor, and nearly twice its 
size; thus, it posed a “lethal threat” if it fell into German hands.33 A German presence in northern 
France made the possibility of an aerial invasion of Britain very real, which, according to notes 
from the War Office, had “shaken the confidence in our ability to develop our war efforts.”34 
Additionally, France’s coasts on both the Atlantic Ocean and the Channel and its proximity to 
Britain made a war at sea an equally large problem looming over the English. Captain H.N. Lake 
wrote that the fall of France coincided with greater activity on the part of German U-boats. Other 
German ships based in French ports along the English Channel only needed to make the short 
and simple journey to put Britain in danger.35 For their own geopolitical security, Britain could 
not avoid doing what it could to save France. 
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The prevailing assumption in the British War Cabinet was that “Britain could not survive 
the fall of France.” Furthermore, it would be “hard to imagine Britain’s future if France, only a 
few minutes away by plane, ceased to be her ally.” Thus, while the French were disappointed by 
the evident lack of British military support during the Battle of France, it was not because 
England disregarded France’s geopolitical importance. In fact, a large part of Britain’s attitude 
towards its alliance with France can be characterized by its mission to ensure that French defeat 
did not lead to “indefinite German hegemony over Europe.”36 In other words, Britain was 
charged with the double responsibility of protecting its own borders from German attack and 
France’s borders, because the French defeat was Britain’s biggest threat.   
 
Armistice 
The conditions of the Franco-German armistice included twenty-four articles that 
outlined the extent of German and Italian control over Metropolitan France. The northern three-
fifths of the country and the entire Atlantic coast came under direct German Occupation, and a 
small zone on the Italian border was under Italian control. The rest of the country, the zone libre, 
came under control of the new Vichy regime, headed by Pétain. While this area had more 
autonomy and was, on paper, still independent France, Vichy was very much a collaborationist 
government and worked closely with Germany. Three of these articles are important in the 
context of British-Free French relations in the following years: Articles Four and Eight 
demobilized the French Army, Navy, and Air Force; and Article Ten forbade any French person 
from fighting against Germany in any manner.37 The Armistice set the stage for the conditions 
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the French would face for the rest of the Occupation, remembered by many as “les années 
tragiques,” namely that they were oppressed subjects of the expanding German Empire.38  
In a speech following the news of the armistice, Winston Churchill discussed the regret 
and astonishment felt in Britain that France had accepted these terms. He spoke about the 
important consequences that would follow if not only France, but her colonies fell into the hands 
of the Germans and Italians. Specifically, he worried about the increasing power Germany and 
Italy could exert from France’s holdings in the Middle East, and, more importantly, about the 
capacity of the French Navy. Even though the armistice laid out conditions forbidding Germany 
from using the French fleet to secure its own war aims, it paralyzed the French Navy from aiding 
resistance efforts.39 Churchill emphasized that, despite the terrible loss, Britain’s “vieille 
camaraderie avec la France n’est pas morte.”40  
Among members of the French government, only General Charles De Gaulle, recently 
appointed by Reynaud as Undersecretary of State for National Defense and War, saw the 
armistice as more than just a humiliating defeat, but as the willingness of the French to accept 
their own oppression. In his famous radio address on June 18, 1940 – after the French 
government surrendered – he explained that the stakes of the war were a black-and-white matter 
of freedom or slavery.41 This, his “most cutting broadcast” and one of his most remembered 
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speeches, commanded “all the Free French to continue fighting wherever they are and however 
they can”; moreover, he added that “I invited all the French who want to remain free to listen to 
me and to follow me.”42 
In a radio speech made on the day of the armistice’s signing, de Gaulle offered another 
glimmer of hope. He invoked French honor, common sense, and national interests as reasons to 
reject both the capitulation and servitude the armistice implied.43 In another radio emission on 
June 24, he compared France to “un boxeur qu'un coup terrible a terrassé,” saying that 
elle gît à terre. Mais elle sait, elle sent qu'elle vit toujours d'une vie profonde et forte. Elle sait, 
sent que l'affaire n'est pas finie, que la cause n'est pas entendue...Elle perçoit dans le nouveau 
monde mille forces immenses matérielles et morales qui, peut-être, se lèveront un jour pour 
écraser les ennemis de la liberté.44  
The hope de Gaulle inspired through his radio speeches became a hallmark of his early resistance 
activity. Though the fear and uncertainty his small audience felt was initially a deterrent, these 
speeches eventually drew in many supporters.45 For him, the armistice was dishonorable for his 
country and his people, but he insisted that France would restore her honor again, despite 
uncertainty from her Allies. He called on his fellow Frenchmen and women to listen to and 
follow him for the duration of the war, declaring: “Long live France free in honor and in 
independence.”46  
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Clearly, between the stubborn optimism propagated by de Gaulle and the threat that the 
Germans posed to Britain, and even the rest of Europe, by occupying France, there was a lot of 
uncertainty about France’s future. Edward Spears, the liaison from the British Government to 
Free France, remarked that “the French situation is not a hopeful one.” He observed “a most 
unbelievable vacillation and changes of policy” within the British government on the subject of 
France and that, as uncertainty worsened, “the effort to organize French resistance in this country 
is being frittered away.”47 De Gaulle’s steadfast commitment to France’s liberation inspired hope 
in at least the possibility of victory among French expatriates and the British. They continued to 
fight and de Gaulle set to work with Churchill on political recognition and, more importantly, 
financial support of his group of resistance fighters that he would call Free France.  
 
Establishment of Free France 
Practically from the moment Charles de Gaulle arrived in London, he recognized that an 
opposition needed to be created in order to counter the Franco-German armistice and the 
impending expansion of the Nazi regime. His “desperate desire” to see France continue to resist 
the Germans drove him to lobby Churchill for the need to create a joint government between the 
French and the British; Churchill agreed.48 On June 23, 1940, Churchill’s War Cabinet received 
de Gaulle’s proposal for the Free French, to continue “le guerre en commun” with the Allies.49 
Its purpose was “to maintain the independence of France, to honor her alliances and to contribute 
to the war effort of the Allies.”50 His organization remained small and weak for quite some time, 
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managing to rally only 7,000 members by the end of that July.51 These first volunteers were “a 
motley band who resembled medieval knights pledging themselves to a baron who had put 
himself forward to the rank of Constable of the kingdom.”52 De Gaulle even argued that France 
and England were “champions of human freedom.”53 Moreover, both the General and the Prime 
Minister recognized a need to rebuild the French state following their humiliating fall to the 
Germans, and, in order to do so, de Gaulle needed to “reconstruct the French state, re-found 
French republicanism, and reorient France’s geopolitical strategy.”54 On this idea, Churchill and 
de Gaulle completely agreed and the Free France movement was established soon thereafter as a 
means of resistance against the Axis occupation. It was comprised of French nationals in 
England and France’s territories in both Africa and the Middle East, who opposed Axis-aligned 
Vichy control.55  
The next day, in a letter to Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax, Churchill recognized Free 
France as “the responsible constitutional representative of France” and the War Cabinet officially 
claimed that, while not an independent government, it was a committee established to “continue 
to fight the common enemy.”56 On June 28, 1940, the British government announced its official 
recognition of Free France. De Gaulle, at Free France’s helm, became “the leader of all Free 
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Frenchmen, wherever they may be, who rally to him in support of the Allied cause.”57 The Prime 
Minister himself stated that “General de Gaulle was a fine fighting soldier, with a good 
reputation and a strong personality, and might be the right man to set up such a Council.”58 On 
becoming the leader of this government-in-exile, De Gaulle wrote “at the age of forty-nine, I was 
entering upon an adventure, like a man thrown by fate outside all terms of reference.”59 This 
highlights how De Gaulle recognized his own inexperience, but, at the same time, his 
determination to rise to the occasion. 
As it stood, Free France’s status was less than that of an independent government, but the 
agreement gave Charles de Gaulle a sort of official position that let him have a seat at the table. 
De Gaulle could represent French interests and Britain agreed to recognize and work with them 
in all matters during the war.60 On the creation of this body, de Gaulle proclaimed that “my aim, 
my sole aim, is to enable French forces, in spite of the temporary laying down of arms, to 
continue the fight and to be present at the final victory.”61 The General turned to René Cassain, a 
lawyer, to formulate the legal status of Free France. Reflecting on a conversation with de Gaulle, 
Cassain said, 
I only need instructions on one point. We are not a foreign legion in the British Army, we are the 
French army. His answer: We are France….I thought if Hitler or one of his French friends were 
watching through the keyhole, they would say ‘what a bunch of lunatics.’ This little professor 
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says ‘we are the French army’ and this tall general declares ‘we are France.’ They’re both ready 
for the loony bin.62  
Because Free France was such a unique entity, there was a lot of ambiguity about how it would 
function. Adding to that confusion was de Gaulle’s assertion that he himself was France. The 
most important takeaways, however, were that Free France’s creation meant the rejection of 
Vichy’s position as the representative of the French people and the rejection of the notion that 
France was in any way vanquished.63  
The goals of the Free French were simple: in the words of de Gaulle, “whatever happens, 
the flame of French resistance must not and shall not die.”64 They saw themselves as the true 
France, now boiled down to Free France and its sympathizers on the mainland and in the 
colonies, and aimed at re-founding the state and the regime along “sounder lines.”65 De Gaulle’s 
main preoccupation, however, was less ideological; he wanted to bring Free France into the war 
to defend France and its territories from the threat of German and Vichy control.66 In one 
instance, de Gaulle told Churchill that the Free French were difficult people to work with “by 
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their nature” and that they “all too easily rebelled against authority.”67 To exacerbate these 
challenges, de Gaulle began to urge French people to “carry out their own terror in opposition to 
that of the Germans and Vichy” via the Free French radio in London as early as 1941.68 
There were three consequences following the creation of Free France. First, de Gaulle 
became the representative of all French people in Britain and, later, several of France’s 
territories. This was the political recognition necessary for Free France to gain access to the 
resources – namely, the British checkbook and military – that allowed it to continue fighting the 
war. Second, the agreement between Churchill and de Gaulle also created a new volunteer army 
across the Empire. For Vichy, this challenged their authority in the colonies, so one of their 
priorities quickly became squashing resistance movements overseas, which fit under the policing 
capabilities laid out in the armistice with Germany. Third, it established that “tous les officiers, 
soldats, marins, aviateurs français, où qu’ils se trouvent, ont le devoir absolu de résister à 
l’ennemi.”69 By making a sense of duty a pillar of the Free French, de Gaulle created both a 
sense of unity and equality among the French across its territories; no longer were French 
Africans subjects of a colonial empire, but soldiers defending their freedom.  
Of course, the core of Free France’s mission was appealing to many French people, but, 
remarkably, anti-Pétain sentiments also drove many individuals to support de Gaulle’s 
movement. Solange Troisier was a medical student in Paris at the beginning of the war, who 
eventually joined the official Resistance under de Gaulle, even though the rest of her family 
tolerated Vichy.70 On her decision to support de Gaulle, Troisier claims that her dislike for Pétain 
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turned her towards someone who had more faith in France’s ability to defeat the Germans. Of 
Pétain, she said  
J'ai eu vraiment une aversion physique pour lui…Il ne croyait pas en la France…j’ai eu 
l’impression que c’est un traître, il n’a pas compris qu’il faillait se battre pour que notre pays…la 
guerre n’était pas perdue, la guerre n’était pas finie.71 
She, and many others, became Gaullists because they had no faith in Pétain. For them, 
supporting de Gaulle was not a choice but a prerequisite of saving France and preserving its 
glory. 
Churchill agreed to help on the grounds of restoring France’s greatness, but made clear 
that territorial boundaries could not be a part of the deal. In one exchange between him and de 
Gaulle, the Prime Minister said that the British have never offered guaranteed borders to any 
nation, but that “we shall, of course, do our best.”72 In reply to these sentiments, de Gaulle wrote,  
You point out that the fact that my troops will not have to “take up arms against France” must be 
interpreted as meaning “a France free to choose her course without being under direct or indirect 
duress from Germany.” I take note, Mr. Prime Minister, that this is the meaning which the British 
government gives to the expressions quoted above. I hope that events will one day enable the 
British government to consider these questions with less reserve.73 
De Gaulle tersely called out Churchill’s hypocrisy on the subject of the French territory. If the 
British can fight for France’s freedom when it comes to military engagements, they must apply 
that same principle to territorial integrity. This exchange foreshadows not only the tone of their 
relationship moving forward in the war, but also the content of their disagreements. When it 
came to the military campaigns in Africa and the Middle East, differences in opinions of 
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Britain’s responsibility to help France preserve its Empire and whether the British or Free France 
should administer those areas colored their political relationship.  
The British played a crucial role not only in Free 
France’s creation, but also its survival throughout the war. 
Winston Churchill believed that a British victory was the last 
hope for the reestablishment of a France free from occupation.74 
The political cartoon in figure 1, published in the summer of 
1940, features a sturdy Churchill carrying de Gaulle, dripping 
and defeated, in his arms.75 The image adds a gendered 
component to their relationship, in that de Gaulle effeminately 
hangs from Churchill’s more dominating, masculine frame. 
Already, that suggests that de Gaulle is the weaker of the two. 
Moreover, it exaggerates the extent to which Britain actually saved France. The power dynamic 
featured here continued throughout the war and relegated de Gaulle to an increasingly inferior 
position. Additionally, an article from The Times a few months after the fall of France said that 
the British Empire “heroically carries almost the entire weight of this gigantic struggle.”76 Thus, 
neither de Gaulle nor Free France as a whole could escape the debt they owed to the British for 
saving them, despite the colonial manpower and motivation to fight that they provided.  
De Gaulle, too, recognized the importance of an alliance with Britain. Yet, he had much 
more confidence in Free France’s ability to liberate his country from the Germans. He looked to 
France’s colonial empire as the “gérants de la souveraineté française.”77 By the beginning of 
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Figure 1: Cartoon of 
Churchill pulling a 
defeated de Gaulle 
ashore. 
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1941, the British population were inspired by de Gaulle’s leadership as well. The same Times 
article, while giving much credit to the British, also understood that     
Free France makes it possible for Frenchmen to fight by its side unto death or unto victory. Free 
France keeps alive in the French people a spirit of loyalty towards our Allies, and it is this loyalty 
which alone to-day prevents the enemy from using for the purposes of its war the nation which it 
now holds in servitude, and which alone to-morrow will enable Europe to be reconstructed in 
accordance with law and freedom.78 
Thus, even though the resources Churchill’s government provided made London a strategic 
destination for a fledgling government like Free France, de Gaulle was not completely helpless, 
as some narratives suggest. He knew that capitulating to the Germans would mean the end of 
France’s honor and independence, but so, too, did he think that of his relationship with the 
British. De Gaulle respected Churchill as Britain’s leader and a critical ally, but only he could sit 
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Chapter 2 – Churchill and De Gaulle: 
 
The creation and survival of the Free France movement depended on the relationship 
between Churchill and De Gaulle. In this section, I will explore how their rapport changed from 
1940-1941 in the context both of their increasingly difficult personalities. It is the story of how 
the British discovered, judged, and, above all, figured out how to work with a brilliant but 
exceedingly difficult man. I will show how the period just after the founding of the Free French 
was marked by Churchill and De Gaulle’s mutual respect, and even their positive perception of 
one another. However, once the movement solidified into a true anti-Vichy force by 1941, when 
its numbers grew and it had collected enough resources militarily, financially, and politically to 
vouch for itself, De Gaulle’s attitude towards Churchill began to change and he became more 
demanding of the British Prime Minister. More and more, Churchill found him unbearable to 
work with. This feeling was exacerbated by the stresses of important military losses in Africa 
and the Middle East, as well as the reality that the war was quickly becoming a bloody, 
protracted conflict that invoked the horrible memories of World War I.   
 
Charles de Gaulle 
Charles de Gaulle spent his entire adult life through the Second World War in the 
military. When he joined the Army, he said “it was one of the greatest things in the world.”1 
Georges Buis, a Free French captain in the Levant who worked closely with the General, said 
that “il n’a d’autre culture que la culture militaire."2 De Gaulle was educated at the Saint-Cyr 
military academy, graduating in 1912, and became a junior officer in the First World War. In 
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1916, he was taken prisoner at Verdun and, after trying and failing to escape five times, spent the 
rest of the war as a German prisoner. While interned, the war continued; Lacouture writes that: 
All those who saw anything of de Gaulle at that time observed in him an almost inhuman want of 
emotion in circumstances of this kind – a magnificent indifference to both terror and pain (though 
not, as we have seen, claiming any merit for it) and in addition an exceptional pride and sense of 
duty.3  
The remarkable death toll among the French during WWI – more than four percent of its 
population, and twenty-five percent of total Entente deaths – wiped out many of De Gaulle’s 
peers. This left the military in a precarious situation by the onset of the Second World War, 
wherein the high ranking officers in the French High Command were aging veterans of the First 
World War. By comparison, De Gaulle was young and progressive. While the military leadership 
was convinced that this war would, like the first one, be a defensive war, De Gaulle argued a 
minority position that modern warfare was mobile and offensive. He wrote that “the Army 
became stuck in a set of ideas which had had their hey-day before the end of the previous war.”4 
The Maginot Line, a defensive strategy, had failed and trench warfare was bloody and 
traumatizing. Yet, French tradition dictated that a young officer like De Gaulle could not argue 
with his superiors, so he was forced to follow their orders. 
De Gaulle’s influence in the military changed in early 1940. A Colonel when the war 
broke out in September 1939, he was promoted to Brigadier General to lead a division of 
armored soldiers in northeastern France.5 He was admired for the courage with which he led his 
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troops and his refusal to believe that France would be defeated. Louis François, a Captain in De 
Gaulle’s Division, remembered that “tout le monde était admiratif et le courage nous revenait. Ce 
courage, il le devait à quoi? A, je crois, la plus grand qualité qu'il ait jamais montrée: la maîtrise 
de soi.”6 Lieutenant Tourtelle of the 46th Tank Battalion recalled one moment in particular that 
sheds light on De Gaulle’s confidence: 
J’avais été envoyé au PC [command post] du colonel De Gaulle avec mission de lui signaler que 
plusieurs chars intacts avaient été enlisés parce que nous n’avions pas pu faire de reconnaissance 
du site. Alors, le colonel m’a dit : ‘Allons voir ces chars, je vous suis.’ Nous sommes donc allés 
jusqu’au pont de Chivres-en-Laonnois, et à ce moment-là, il m’a dit : ‘Menez-moi vers les chars.’ 
Je lui ai fait remarquer que, à gauche comme à droite, il y avait des infiltrations allemandes et que 
nous risquions de recevoir des coups. Il m’a répondu : ‘On ne tire pas sur deux hommes isolés 
dans la nature.’ Je lui ai dit : ‘d’accord, mais sur des officiers, oui.’ Il a rétorqué : ‘Ils ne verront 
pas avec nos vestes de cuir et notre casque que nous sommes des officiers.’ Nous sommes donc 
partis. Je dois avouer que j’avais très peur, mais que derrière cet homme, qui avait une telle 
assurance, j’y suis allé et il avait raison.7  
From the beginning, it is clear that De Gaulle was a man who instilled trust and hope in those 
followed him, and these characteristics were important with the founding of Free France later on.  
Pétain regarded De Gaulle as his protégé and had called him “the most intelligent officer 
in the French army.”8 Following the end of the war, and as “one of the army’s rare intellectuals,” 
he became a teacher and a staff officer.9 In fact, De Gaulle’s military mind earned him profound 
respect among both the British and French. Sir Basil Liddell Hart, a British captain during World 
War I turned military historian and theorist, quoted a James Marlow passage that called De 
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Gaulle “the prototype of the most modern military mind.”10 Others equally regarded him as a 
military genius with an expertise in modern warfare; one opinion piece in The Sunday Times, 
written by French national Elie-J. Bois described De Gaulle in the following way:  
from his face, his gestures, his words, in short, from the whole man I retain the impression of 
strength – a strength at once tenacious, unhurried, and intelligent…He is a soldier, certainly, but 
what a solider! But he is more than that; in the words of a friend of mine, who is his assistant: ‘He 
is a sword with a brain!’11  
Not only, then, was the military a foundational part of Charles de Gaulle himself, but also of 
France. He believed it was essential to France’s greatness and exerting military influence over 
France’s colonies was a priority of Free France.12 De Gaulle’s attitude went a long way in 
boosting the morale of his troops as well. Commandant François also noted that the General “n’a 
jamais perdu l’espoir de tenir aussi longtemps que possible et d’éviter autant que possible la 
défaite.”13 More than his optimism about the outcome of the war, members of De Gaulle’s 
division noticed his dedication to and focus on the battle at hand. General Paul Nérot commented 
that he often came off as hard and abrupt, but the only thing that De Gaulle cared about was the 
mission.14  
De Gaulle flew to London on behalf of Reynaud and met Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill for the first time on June 9, 1940.15 He proposed that Churchill should use British 
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forces to evacuate French soldiers to North Africa, but Churchill refused. Even many of 
Reynaud’s ministers offered little support for this plan, which they claimed had come too late 
and was “ill prepared and totally irrelevant to France’s situation.”16 De Gaulle returned to 
France, but only for a short period; on June 16 – after Reynaud resigned and it became clear that 
the new French government would sign an armistice with Germany – De Gaulle left France 
again for London, where he would live for part of the war in exile, moving regularly between 
Britain and North Africa.17 While he recognized the danger that his country and all of Europe 
faced, he promised that “if I live I’ll fight, wherever it is necessary, for as long as it is necessary, 
until the enemy is defeated and the stain on the nation effaced.”18 
 
First Impressions 
Even in the beginning of the war, Charles de Gaulle was a controversial figure. In the 
spring of 1940, he was largely unknown by the French and British alike; however, among 
members of the French military, he was widely respected.19 De Gaulle was promoted to the rank 
of General just three weeks before his appointment by Paul Reynaud as the Undersecretary for 
War, which speaks to both his military skills and competence.20 They admired his ability to 
inspire hope after the fall of France, which made his BBC radio talks popular among those living 
in other parts of the French Empire.21 French priest Ambroise-Marie Carré described De Gaulle 
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as “quelqu’un qui m’a enthousiasmé par sa manière courageuse, j’allais dire officielle, et 
terriblement risquée.”22 Similarly, Edgard Pisani, a Tunisian intellectual living in Paris during 
the war, noted that the General had “une voix qu’on entendait, qu’on attendait, et qui changeait 
la couleur du ciel.”23 Furthermore, he perpetuated a mythos of himself which held that he was a 
political rags-to-riches story, that he had come from nothing but, through his relationships with 
devoted companions, established “le vrai gouvernement de la République Française” and in his 
refusal to bend, compromise, or break, “obligea les Alliés à l’accepter.”24 Moreover, he truly 
embodied “la voix de millions de Français,” all of whom wanted to erase from their memories 
the embarrassment of their defeat in 1940 and affirm to the world that France remained a great 
power.25 So, in terms of his favorable early impressions, De Gaulle was seen as a man who 
inspired hope and offered to lead his people to freedom when no one else stepped forward. 
Among the French, these were admirable qualities.  
Many members of the British War Cabinet found De Gaulle difficult to work with from 
the beginning. He had been described as “inexpressibly remote, intensely reserved, apparently 
lacking in humor or concern for others, [and] a man from another era who belonged in a suit of 
armor and helmet.”26 Anthony Eden first met the General on June 11, 1940, and remarked that he 
was “unnecessarily tough.”27 British civil servant John Colville wondered whether he was “a 
new Napoleon,” and he believed he was “best kept on a string for some time to come.” Other 
accounts from many of the people who worked closely with the General convey these same 
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themes: he was stubborn, aloof, and proudly French with an insatiable superiority complex. 
Clement Attlee, the Deputy Prime Minister, described De Gaulle and his entourage as practically 
fascist, which may have come from the authoritarian 
manner that belied the General’s democratic 
convictions.28 One political cartoon published in 
France during the war (Figure 2) goes so far as to 
compare De Gaulle to Hitler and references 
Napoleon.29 
General Alan Brooke, the Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff, was probably the most 
disdainful of De Gaulle among members of the War 
Cabinet. Edward Spears recalled an exchange between the two of them, in which,  
Brooke, spitting with rage at De Gaulle, said the greatest public service I could render would be to 
knock him on the head. It seems [De Gaulle] will go on ordering his troops about without any 
reference to the British, which is for one thing extremely stupid, as he cannot transport them.30  
Additionally, Spears complained in his diary of De Gaulle’s overbearing manner, megalomania, 
and lack of cooperative spirit. On this last characteristic, the Assistant Private Secretary to the 
King Alan Lascelles wrote in his diary that, while carting potatoes, he “was continually struck by 
the resemblance the average large potato bears to General de Gaulle, though the potato is, of 
course, the more malleable of the two.”31 Though he was clearly opposed to the policies coming 
out of the British Foreign Office, General Hastings Ismay, Churchill’s chief military assistant at 
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Figure 2: “Hm..I had better shave my 
moustache to avoid confusion.” 
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the time, remarked that his disagreement with their decisions was due to De Gaulle bullying 
them into letting him dictate their policy.32 
Colonel J.A. Watson, who participated in the attempted Dakar landings in September 
1940, commented on the similarities between De Gaulle and the British Liaison to the Free 
French Edward Spears. He describes Spears as,  
being somewhat difficult and I proceeded warily – quite unnecessarily, as it turned out, for one 
would not wish for a better chief and I got on very well with him. He…[had] a very strong 
character, which rather explained the reputation he had of being ‘difficult.’ He did not put up with 
any nonsense, did not allow anyone to impinge upon his prerogatives and knew exactly what he 
wanted. He was remarkably intelligent, he had an astonishing memory and spoke and wrote 
French better than many educated Frenchmen. Furthermore, he was quite fearless, as I was to find 
out later. He was an indefatigable worker, even in the tropics, detested sloppiness and insisted 
upon sound and regular administration, with no frills, and he wanted to know about, and control, 
everything that was within his province.33  
When he discusses De Gaulle, Watson remarks that this characterization of Spears is “as good a 
description as one could find.” These similarities in personality traits help explain why the two 
generals clashed so sharply, and later fell out altogether. The important difference, Watson 
emphasizes, is that Spears was bilingual and comfortable speaking French, whereas De Gaulle 
never spoke English.34 Watson does qualify this statement by saying that De Gaulle read English 
perfectly and never asked for explanation during meetings conducted in English; therefore, his 
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refusal to speak English may point to an overwhelming pride in his French heritage and 
language, which superseded any desire to make conducting political matters easier. 
Many British officials observed a shift in De Gaulle’s attitude after they recognized the 
Free French. Vice Admiral Muselier wrote that, in his “determination to be in absolute command 
of the French forces,” De Gaulle carefully avoided accepting the help of more senior officers, or 
“of those better known than himself.” On De Gaulle’s failed negotiations with Generals Nogués 
and Mittelhauser in the summer of 1940, during which his suggestion to carry on resisting an 
armistice was rejected, Muselier also wrote that they might have been more successful “if De 
Gaulle had acted with more diplomacy and less vanity from the start.”35 However, one of De 
Gaulle’s biographers, Aidan Crawley, gave more credit to the General for the difficult position in 
which he found himself in 1940. He wrote: 
I think [De Gaulle] felt it quite unfair that the English Channel prevented the British being 
overrun by the Germans as they undoubtedly would have been had there been no Channel. And I 
don’t think he could ever get over this. He felt that France was the greatest of all the races and 
here were the British on their little Island once again able to survive and able to fight back and all 
this was really too unfair to be true. And, you know, he never conceded that the British had a 
literature and only used our language with reluctance and so on. I think this was all great 
jealousy. He couldn’t really understand why a people who, in so many ways, seemed to lack the 
critical faculties and brilliance of the French could have had such a remarkable history.36 
What Crawley’s comment helps establish is the complicated relationship between De Gaulle and 
the British. He depended on the resources they offered and asylum from Vichy death threats. 
Yet, he simultaneously felt a profound sense of frustration towards the British that they had 
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maintained all of the things that France had lost after the Germans invaded. Most importantly, 
they had borders and a free government, but both of these meant the British could practice their 
culture and openly speak their language, which were of great significance as well to De Gaulle. 
He was lost, or at least isolated, in Britain, a country in which everyone spoke a different 
language, practiced a different religion, and held tight to different cultural traditions. He was, in 
this sense, like a washed-up Robinson Crusoe; he was tough because he had to be, and adapted 
as best he could to the British ways without sacrificing the French heritage so foundational to his 
being.37  
Despite the significant challenges De Gaulle faced following the tragic defeat of France, 
he continued fighting for France’s liberation from Britain. To do this, he relied heavily on 
Churchill. After the first few interactions between the two leaders, it was clear the General 
greatly respected the Prime Minister. Moreover, Churchill fully supported the General in the 
beginning and referred to him as “l’homme du destin.”38 However, there was a degree to which 
De Gaulle recognized that Great Britain would help France if they needed it, but only if its own 
interests would also be served; in that sense, De Gaulle was deeply suspicious of the English.39 It 
is nonetheless critical to note that Churchill and Great Britain did help De Gaulle create the Free 
French movement in “the dark days of June 1940,” assistance which De Gaulle never forgot.40 
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De Gaulle wrote that the harsh and painful incidents that often arose between him and Churchill 
were due to “the friction of our two characters, of the opposition of certain interests in our two 
countries, and of the abuses inflicted by England to the detriment of France.”41 One of the most 
famous quotes from his memoirs speaks directly to that tension: “When I am right, I get angry. 
Churchill gets angry when he is wrong. We are angry at each other much of the time.”42 
However, he qualified this by adding that, while these problems influenced his attitude towards 
the Prime Minister, they did not impact his judgment of the man. Winston Churchill appeared to 
him, “from one end of the drama to the other, as the great champion of a great enterprise and the 
great artist of a great history.”43  
The fact remains that the partnership between the two men was unequal. De Gaulle’s 
need for Churchill, whom he described as “indispensable,” dictated his initial demeanor towards 
the Prime Minister.44 Specifically, De Gaulle needed two things from Britain: recognition of the 
Free French as a political force – not just a concept or ideology – and military and financial 
support. In terms of the former, it is important to recall that Free France was, at first, just a 
movement: it had no claim to a territory, a people, or political bargaining. Thus, the fact that “De 
Gaulle had the support of a great power behind him” proved to be of the utmost importance.45 On 
their relationship with each other once Britain recognized Free France, Churchill said that De 
Gaulle was “completely subservient [to] him;” at the same time, the General exhibited an 
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“insufferable rudeness to anyone on a lower level.”46 So, while Churchill offered De Gaulle more 
patience, likely due in part to the limited contact the two of them actually shared, De Gaulle was 
just as aloof towards the Prime Minister as he was towards anyone else.  
Military and financial support were important for De Gaulle and the Free French because 
they had no other access to these resources; Britain was the most promising prospect for 
obtaining that support.47 Serge Ravanel, a Free French soldier, recalled that among the main 
criticisms of Free France was that they did not represent anything and prevented Pétain from 
carrying out the armistice policies, and that they were outlaws.48  
Because the purpose of the Free French was, above all, to join the war effort and fight the 
Germans and Vichy, a military was critical. In his letter from July 10 to Prime Minister 
Churchill, De Gaulle also asked for an air force.49 The little support De Gaulle had in the summer 
of 1940 would have made it impossible for the Free French to have any kind of military success 
or political legitimacy.50 This legitimacy came to be the most important element of what 
Churchill could provide for De Gaulle, and the General believed that military success would help 
garner support for the Free French’s legitimacy even more. He was always on his guard against 
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the dangers to the Free French position resulting from what looked very much like a client-
patron relationship with the British. During the war, “there was a raw and angry quality to his 
behavior” and he often seemed neither to realize nor care how much he risked alienating his 
friends.51  
 
“Joan of Arc Complex” 
One of the ways that General de Gaulle’s personality impacted his ability to work with 
others, including Churchill, was his tendency to imagine himself as France incarnate. Vice 
Admiral Muselier observed that it was De Gaulle’s mission to be recognized as such “in exactly 
the same way as Pétain, and therefore, Pétain soon became his chief enemy.”52 In a radio 
broadcast from June 19, De Gaulle asserted that he had the power to speak in name of France.53 
While all leaders make this claim to some extent, it is significant here because De Gaulle was not 
an actual French official in any capacity; at this point, he was just a General living in exile. Yet, 
Lucien Neuwirth, a sixteen-year old French boy living in London, said that De Gaulle was “tout 
à la fois, il était l’honneur de la France, il était la promesse de la libération de notre pays, il était 
l’avenir.”54 Years after the war, Churchill said  
General de Gaulle will always be remembered as the symbol of the soul of France, and of the 
unbreakable integrity of her spirit in adversity. I remember when I saw him in the somber days of 
1940, I said: ‘There is the Constable of France!’ How well he lived up to that title!55 
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De Gaulle explained that identifying himself with France itself was “a way of constituting a new 
legitimacy for his weakened and demoralized people,” a legitimacy based on honor, duty, and 
greatness.”56 In his first radio address from London, De Gaulle justified both his actions and his 
new, public identity as a statesman embodying the defense of le salut national, or the nation’s 
salvation.57 Churchill observed that this habit was probably a way “to prove to French eyes that 
he was not a British puppet.”58  
De Gaulle also personified France by associating himself with legendary French national 
figures. Specifically, he favored the Joan of Arc metaphor, to which he referred so frequently 
that those in his immediate circle referred to it as “the Joan of Arc complex.”59 The metaphor 
was, in part, born from the fact that De Gaulle allegedly had an ancestor who was one of the 
knights attendant of Joan of Arc.60 However, the connection between De Gaulle and Joan of Arc 
specifically was a personally deep one for him and for his generation. She is used by both the left 
and right (and at the time by Vichy France as well) to represent national courage and pride. She 
was deeply mystical (as was De Gaulle), so the French King’s victory in 1429 at Orléans, which 
was possible in large part because of her military leadership, was read as a sign that God was on 
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the side of the French King and not the English King. Her belief in French sovereignty and in 
France’s place as among the divinely chosen is present in De Gaulle’s speeches and in his 
memoirs. De Gaulle saw his mission as aligned with that of Joan of Arc: it was his destiny to 
defend France’s honor and preserve France’s independence.  
De Gaulle’s Catholic beliefs are also important in this context. Lacouture writes that “No 
one could bear witness to the efficacity of the various forms of Catholic education in France at 
the turn of the century more than Charles de Gaulle.”61 This demonstrates both the depth and 
breadth of his Catholic upbringing, which underpinned who he was and his perception of the 
war. De Gaulle saw France as having a singular destiny and that he was selected by God himself 
to achieve it during the war. In other words, he saw his destiny and that of France as one in the 
same. His deep Catholic beliefs also help explain the difficulty he had adjusting to life in Britain, 
a country hostile to his religion, as well as his choice of the Croix de Lorraine as the symbol of 
Free France.62 He rooted himself in the rich, long history of his country and was specifically 
attracted to the strength of Old France – to De Gaulle, and others, “True France” – all of which 
were intricately wound around the role and power of the Church.63  
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The comparison to Joan of Arc is especially interesting when one considers who was 
actually using the metaphor. General de Gaulle often invoked this metaphor as a response to 
opponents who challenged his claim to legitimacy and in one exchange with President Roosevelt, 
stated that “Joan of Arc had drawn her legitimacy from taking action and refusing to lose 
hope.”64 Yet, when Churchill or Roosevelt compared the General to this French heroine, it was 
primarily a way of patronizing De Gaulle; the comparison served to dismiss the General’s belief 
that he was akin to such an important person in French historical narrative. Further, by 
comparing him to a French woman, there is a deeper power dynamic at play. Of all the powerful 
French figures to compare to De Gaulle, the choice of a woman seems to reinforce the weaker 
position in which De Gaulle found himself compared to the rest of the Allied leadership. In this 
sense, the term “complex” may not fully encapsulate the effects of the comparison. While De 
Gaulle proudly associated himself with Joan of Arc, the metaphor carries an entirely different 
connotation when invoked by others around him.  
The General also turned to other heroic characters in the French national narrative. In one 
radio address from July 2, 1940, De Gaulle spoke of two paths the French could choose to take: 
one of despair and hopelessness, under Vichy, and the other of honor and hope. Of this choice, 
he said 
Mais beaucoup de Français se trouvent déchirés entre les deux chemins. D’une part, l’appel des 
Gouvernants tombés au pouvoir de l’ennemi ; d’autre part, l’appel de la France qui crie vers la 
délivrance. Ces bons Français, ces simples Français, ces Français qui font passer la France avant 
la cause de l’orgueil, de la terreur ou des intérêts, je les adjure de se demander ceci : Jeanne 
d’Arc, Richelieu, Louis XIV, Carnot, Napoléon, Gambetta, Poincaré, Clemenceau, le Maréchal 
Foch, auraient-ils jamais consenti à livrer toutes les armes de la France à ses ennemis pour qu’ils 
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puissent s’en servir contres ses Alliés ? Duquesne, Tourville, Suffren, Courbet, Guépratte, 
auraient-ils jamais consenti à mettre à la discrétion de l’ennemi une flotte française intacte ?65   
De Gaulle was deeply shaped by French history and his country’s historical greatness, which 
explains his refusal to budge on issues of French national interest. For De Gaulle, a French 
victory was as national an issue as it was personal. 
At the same time, much of De Gaulle’s attitude was tactical; that is, it must be considered 
in the context of the war: if he budged an inch with the British, he might lose a mile. In other 
words, De Gaulle’s precarious position convinced him that he had to be firm and unrelenting on 
issues of French interest, otherwise he risked being steamrolled by the British, or even forgotten 
completely. Edward Spears, the British liaison to the Free French, remarked that he “was 
extremely tiresome most of the time, a great deal of the time,” but that “the fault wasn’t entirely 
on his side – anything but.”66 Moreover, Spears noted that in the beginning of De Gaulle’s 
alliance with the British, he 
was completely at sea. He didn’t know what was going to happen to him, how he was going to 
handle the situation. It didn’t occur to anybody that he was – and I’m not at all sure that he saw of 
himself as – a political figure. Events pushed him into the position which he assumed.67  
This perception of De Gaulle in part speaks to the game of catch-up he had to play. De Gaulle 
was not a politician but, literally overnight, was pushed into that role because nobody else 
stepped forward. More than this, it also points to the fact that history is lived going forward, and 
nobody knew what the future would hold. In this sense, De Gaulle’s leadership is like the blind 
leading the blind.  
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Spears was not the only British official to accept that De Gaulle’s behavior was in large 
part a result of the circumstances. Winston Churchill’s secretary Sir John Peck similarly 
remarked that: 
General de Gaulle was a very, very, very difficult man to work with for various reasons. First, 
obviously, he liked having his own way. And equally, I think he was very much conscious that he 
carried the burden of the honor of France and the restoration of the grandeur of France rested on 
his shoulders. So I think perhaps he may have felt it was a bound and duty upon him to be at 
times extremely stiffened and obstinate and even rude. But sometimes, one felt that he found that 
duty not uncongenial.68  
While De Gaulle was unpopular among the British and often clashed with the political elite, 
there was still a basic understanding that the losses he had experienced had to be taken into 
account. This meant he had to be tough and unrelenting because he felt he was the only person 
truly fighting for France’s interests.  
Moreover, it is important to remember that De Gaulle was at a serious disadvantage in 
these early years. Maurice Dejean, an advisor to De Gaulle, said that he, 
ended up having to explain to the British that they had to consider De Gaulle as scraped raw. As a 
man with the sensitivity of someone who had been skinned alive. He was so patriotic and suffered 
so much seeing France in a state of humiliation that the mere appearance of encroaching on 
French sovereignty produced extremely brutal reactions. He was like a man with no skin who you 
were touching with a burning match.69  
At the same time as the climate of 1940 caused De Gaulle and the British cabinet a lot of grief, 
the General’s attitude also earned him a lot of respect. Bois wrote in The Sunday Times that “he 
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has saved the honor of my country.”70 Edward Spears said that, despite the confusion and chaos 
following the fall of France, “all I knew was that [De Gaulle] wanted to go on fighting.”71  While 
every other member of the British Cabinet had political experience, De Gaulle was thrown into 
government without any prior knowledge or time to learn the etiquette of foreign affairs. 
Moreover, he had already lost his country and been sentenced to death by Vichy if he returned; 
while the British were fearful of a German attack, they still sat more or less comfortably in their 
own homes in their own country, whereas De Gaulle was an outsider in England. Spears’ earlier 
metaphor that De Gaulle was lost at sea, then, appears to be apt, with the qualification that the 
General was only just learning to sail. 
 
Winston Churchill 
De Gaulle’s counterpart, the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, was a 
problematic character in his own right. After two unsuccessful attempts to gain admission to the 
Royal Military Academy, Churchill was finally accepted on the third try and spent a brief 
amount of time in his early adulthood in the British military. This gave him a very different kind 
of military experience from De Gaulle. He was involved in campaigns in India and South Africa, 
but was elected to the House of Commons in 1900 which began his long career in politics. In 
1911, Prime Minister Asquith appointed Churchill to First Lord of the Admiralty. As such, he 
worked closely with the Royal Navy up through the disastrous Battle of Gallipoli during the First 
World War, which was his idea. After that, he lost his position at the Admiralty and returned to 
the House of Commons. He occupied various ministerial positions throughout the 1930s, during 
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which he advocated for rearmament. In September 1939, he was invited back to the Admiralty; 
however, he only remained in that position for a few months until, in May 1940, he succeeded 
Neville Chamberlain as Prime Minister.  
Unlike De Gaulle, Churchill was above all a politician. He knew how to compose himself 
in political matters in ways that conveyed strength, patriotism, and even charm. Historian 
Christian Destremau writes of his “grandeur unique” and that his colleagues were “stupéfaits par 
le dynamisme et le courage physique.”72 Maxwell Schoenfeld says that Churchill valued honor 
more than most politicians and was straightforward and simple in his demeanor.73 Additionally, 
John Colville, a British civil servant and close friend of Winston, claimed that “once his 
affection was given, it lasted, but his animosity was transitory and it was not in his nature to bear 
a grudge.”74 One of the more descriptive accounts of Churchill comes from Edward Spears. He 
wrote about an encounter with the Prime Minister upon his return from Africa in November 
1940, saying that he 
saw Winston in his subterranean cavern wearing the most extraordinary suit, something between 
a battledress and rompers, all done up with zip fasteners, with large diagonal stomach pockets, the 
whole thing a sort of blue fancy woolen stuff, looking for all the world like one of the suits Wells 
describes as being worn by humans two thousand years hence. He was smoking a big cigar and I 
was only with him for a few minutes and I was not received as well as I had hoped to be though 
he was very pleasant. Underlying was that sort of affection that is so lovable about him.75 
Evidenced by his experiences both in the military and as a political leader who worked 
closely with the military, Churchill was fascinated by war. On one hand, he brought with him 
into office a strong sense of history, particularly his own experiences in World War I. He had 
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never forgotten the failure of Gallipoli or the bitter political experience of losing his cabinet post 
afterwards. He wrote that his memories of World War I caused him to underestimate the force of 
the German tank attack in World War II.76 Peter Mangold writes that his impulsiveness, 
combined with a gambler’s spirit and a natural belligerence, “constantly threatened to override 
sound calculation of risks” which made him extremely difficult to work with. Valentine 
Lawford, the Private Secretary to Anthony Eden, recalled her struggles with the Prime Minister 
in a diary entry from January 9, 1941: 
I was summoned to No.10 [Downing Street] urgently to interpret between Winston and a 
Frenchman (De Gaulle). C’est tout un art – and alas one I have not mastered. W. was in a romper-
suit of air force grey wool, smoking a cigar and looking bleary. A. Eden was there too to give me 
moral support. Winston treated me like a bad smell to begin with and was extremely ungracious 
(like Jackie after too much brandy) but I got my own back by translating his opponent’s French 
into rather rude Winstonian English.77 
British military officer Major Desmond Morton describes the Prime Minister’s “emotional and 
mercurial temperament.”78 Lord Beaverbrook called him a “creature of strange moods” and that 
at certain times Churchill had in him “the stuff of which tyrants are made.”79 The South African 
Prime Minister, Field Marshal Jan Smuts, even told De Gaulle not to give too much importance 
to Churchill’s frequent changes of mood. Yet, Churchill was intensely loyal and placed a great 
deal of importance on personal relations.80  
Churchill exhibited remarkable political power as wartime Prime Minister and kept the 
trust and attention of both the public and Parliament. He made public appearances and speeches 
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that solidified his dedication to serving Britain and addressed the War Office with a dynamism 
and conviction that made opposing him difficult. In this regard, Colonel J.A. Watson referred to 
him “as an amazing judge of men and a born leader.”81 Moreover, Schoenfeld remarks that he 
“probed constantly at the frontiers of administrative procedure” and ignored the chain of 
command.82 This tendency of Churchill’s, while effective in some instances, tended to frustrate 
those working with him. André Beaufre, a French staff officer who served with the General Staff 
of the French Army High Command in 1940, recalled one meeting where Churchill ignored the 
procedures already in place: 
We had the meeting in the dining room and we had to wait for the dinner in the drawing room and 
at that time I saw Spears going to Churchill who was sat in an armchair…saying ‘Mr. Prime 
Minister, I would like to introduce you to General de Gaulle.’ I said ‘yes, yes, yes,’ and then 
Spears went to De Gaulle and introduced him to Churchill and Churchill said ‘sit down,’ and then 
they began to speak and chat. But I of course did not hear what they said. And then the dinner 
was served and we had to move to the dining room and the aide had made a very careful and very 
difficult table plan because all these ministers, marshals, Prime Ministers, and so on had to be put 
in a certain regular order. And then Churchill said, in French, ‘Oh I’ll keep Charles de Gaulle at 
my side, you know, we have a very interesting discussion,’ so he kept De Gaulle at the side of 
him and, oh, the plan was ruined. And the aide was ready to shoot himself.83  
This serves as an example of Churchill’s initial sympathies towards De Gaulle. It also reveals 
how working with Churchill initially involved a power struggle, even though the consequences 
of that were, in this case, minimal. Churchill had a habit of pushing forward the plans he had in 
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mind with little regard for what others had already decided. Such difficulties were exacerbated 
once De Gaulle’s stubbornness became a factor as well. Both the General and the Prime Minister 
fought to have plans go their way, but when their ideas stood in opposition to one another, 
tensions often boiled over.  
 
Churchill and the Free French 
In the beginning of his relationship with De Gaulle, Churchill was really quite impressed 
with the General. In his memoirs, Churchill recalled that the General was “magnificent in his 
demeanor” and had “made a favorable impression” after their first several encounters.84 In fact, 
Churchill pushed for the decision to create Free France, alongside De Gaulle, and was quick to 
recognize the General as the movement’s leader.85 This recognition was crucial for De Gaulle, 
and especially noteworthy when one takes into account how peculiar De Gaulle’s diplomatic 
status really was; after all, he claimed to represent a country which already had a leader in 
Pétain, and the people who rallied around De Gaulle belonged to many different countries.86 
Really, the only political power De Gaulle was afforded was that which Churchill was willing to 
give to him, but the Prime Minister was, in the beginning, willing to do so. On the other side, De 
Gaulle was equally impressed with Churchill at first. After their first meeting on June 9, 1940, 
De Gaulle recorded in his memoirs that he felt confident that, under Churchill’s leadership, Great 
Britain “ne fléchirait certainement pas.” Moreover, the Prime Minister seemed “to be equal to the 
rudest task” and was, on top of everything, “fitted by his character to act, take risks, and play the 
                                                        
84 Fenby, The General, 141.; War Cabinet, minutes, 12 June, 1940, Cabinet papers, 65/7, in The Churchill 
War Papers, 305.; Destremau, Churchill et la France, 7-8.; Maguire, “Notre mal de tête commun,” 593. 
Despite these general feelings of admiration, Churchill did manage to mix in a bit of “repulsion” or 
contempt as well. Specifically, he found De Gaulle’s pride, pettiness, and lack of courtesy unsettling and 
compared de Gaulle to a puppy which Churchill raised from birth, but still barked quite a bit. In other 
words, De Gaulle was not yet totally subservient to Churchill’s will, which frustrated the Prime Minister. 
85 Maguire, “Notre mal de tête commun,” 594. 
86 Kersaudy, Churchill and De Gaulle, 89.  
Sullivan__    
 
51 
part out-and-out and without scruple.”87 Paul Maze, an admirer of Churchill, said of one of the 
Prime Minister’s speeches that:  
Chaque mot que vous avez prononcé a été comme une goutte de sang dans une transfusion. Je 
sais que les gens en France auront pris tous les risques pour vous écouter car vous leur êtes 
irrésistible et ils ont besoin d’entendre vos appels si humains.88  
These early interactions indicate the mutual respect between De Gaulle and Churchill. Yet, the 
fall of France did strain their relationship and was a significant obstacle both men had to 
overcome.  
On August 20, 1940, Churchill made a speech to the House of Commons on the situation 
in France in which he clearly conveyed his commitment not only to liberating France from the 
oppressive Vichy and German regimes, but also recognizing De Gaulle as that liberating force’s 
leader: 
That France alone should lie prostrate at this moment, is the crime, not of a great and noble 
nation, but of what are called ‘the men of Vichy.’ We have profound sympathy with the French 
people. Our old comradeship with France is not dead. In General de Gaulle and his gallant band, 
that comradeship takes an effective form. These free Frenchmen have been condemned to death 
by Vichy, but the day will come, as surely as the sun will rise tomorrow, when their names will 
be held in honor, and their names will be graven in stone in the streets and villages of a France 
restored in a liberated Europe to its full freedom and its ancient fame.89 
For the French, this recalled memories of Dunkirk. Churchill’s speech made little sense to them 
in this context because they remembered Operation Dynamo as the British abandonment of the 
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French, a major betrayal. The speech also underscores how De Gaulle was acting as a rebel; 
Churchill recognizes that Vichy had condemned the General to death and that his activities in 
London with the Free French made him a traitor. It seems that, in putting himself in the 
crosshairs of the French government, De Gaulle preserved Churchill’s respect for him.  
Of course, this speech also conveys another element of Churchill’s attitude towards De 
Gaulle: his dependence on the General. June 1940 was not only detrimental to the French, but 
instilled a great amount of fear in the British as well as they now realized that “the full might of 
the Nazi war machine would be turned against Britain.”90 Churchill faced resistance in his own 
party regarding British support for France, so he leaned on De Gaulle as a reason to send help. 
De Gaulle was evidence that the French were fighting back and willing to stand up against the 
Germans. In risking his life for his country, De Gaulle became a pillar of Churchill’s case to the 
British for aiding France.   
At the same time, supporting France was a complicated matter because of the disparity 
between De Gaulle’s and the French Empire’s willingness to resist and the attitudes of those still 
living in France. According to Churchill, France was “rotten, rotten from the inside” and he had 
lost faith that the French would rebound from their defeat.91 The Germans now had access to 
ports on the Atlantic Coast and English Channel that would potentially allow them to threaten 
the British navy. The close proximity of the two countries made it feasible for aerial attacks to 
take place. Not only were these possibilities threatening on their face, but the weaknesses in 
British armaments made them even more so; Great Britain had at its defense only “a few badly 
organized divisions armed with rifles, less than 500 field-guns, 200 tanks and 25 air squadrons. 
Even the navy was overstretched and woefully short of destroyers.”92 Thus, it was geopolitically 
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imperative, for Britain to oust the Vichy regime and France’s German occupiers, and Churchill 
found in De Gaulle a man whose intense patriotism and military experience would help ensure 
that that happened.93 
Despite this early rapport, their relationship quickly soured following the disasters in 
Africa at the end of 1940, notably Mers-el-Kébir and the fiasco at Dakar. By November 1940, 
John Colville recorded in one famous entry that “the PM said that De Gaulle was definitely an 
embarrassment to us now in our dealings with Vichy and the French people.”94 While Vichy had 
severed ties with Britain following Mers-el-Kébir, the British and Vichy had many adjacent 
colonies in Africa and the Middle East. It remained important not to provoke Vichy, then, 
because of the risk they posed to the security of those territories.  
Moving forward from 1940, the Prime Minister would adopt a mixture of amusement and 
indignation toward the General. The reason for this sharp change in opinion might be because of 
the absolute failure of Operation Menace in September, where the Free French utterly failed to 
capture the strategic port of Dakar in Vichy-controlled West Africa. Following Dakar were 
several other conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa that damaged their relationship, so 
much so that by September of the following year, the Prime Minister was “sick of the Free 
French,” and, understandably, of De Gaulle as well.95 These conflicts also saw the resurfacing of 
old Anglo-French rivalries, exacerbated by the personal rivalry between De Gaulle and 
Churchill, as they each put his respective national concerns at the forefront of his agenda, which 
naturally conflicted in many respects.  
From the other side, De Gaulle became increasingly resistant to following British orders 
because he felt they rarely, if ever, sufficiently accounted for France’s interests (such as the 
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evacuation of Dunkirk). Moreover, in the fall of 1940 Free France had made significant gains in 
Africa, largely without British aid. By the end of November, all of French Equatorial Africa had 
rallied behind De Gaulle, which gave Free France a large swath of territory out of which to 
operate, as well as a large number of colonial troops. Of course, it makes sense from the British 
perspective that they focused on preserving their own empire and keeping their people safe more 
than on doing those things for France, but De Gaulle – seeing himself as France – took these 
decisions as personal slights. Certainly Churchill saw himself as Britain personified as well, but 
the difference between the two leaders in this regard is that Churchill actually held significant 
decision-making power. In other words, De Gaulle argued that Vichy and the German occupiers 
were not the real government of France. Instead, it was he who represented the French state and 
Churchill, in giving official recognition to Free France, agreed. Yet, time and again Churchill 
refused to let De Gaulle officially act in this role – De Gaulle was excluded from the planning 
processes of campaigns like Mers-el-Kébir and the Levant, he was kept from international 
conferences, and was constantly belittled and dismissed by members of the British government. 
Even if Churchill took De Gaulle’s actions personally or as attacks on Britain as a whole, he had 
the privilege, more or less, of ignoring them. De Gaulle, on the other hand, felt personally 
betrayed by Churchill and Britain in several cases, such as the Saint John of Acre Armistice in 
1941, but had little to no recourse to defend France’s interests. This asymmetrical power 
dynamic defined their personal interactions. 
It became a common narrative among members of the War Cabinet that Churchill was 
like Atlas but with two worlds to carry; in the words of Lord Beaverbrook, “with one hand 
[Churchill] bears up the British Empire and with the other he sustains the French Republic. And 
the French Republic takes a bit of supporting, too.”96 In some accounts, the relationship between 
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Churchill and De Gaulle was less a rivalry and more like that of a father and his disobedient 
son.97 Surely De Gaulle would resent this characterization, as the narrative belittles the position 
De Gaulle was in, but it is nonetheless effective at emphasizing differences in age – which is to 
say the gravitas or respect that comes with seniority – experience, and power. Objectively, 
Churchill had the advantage in all three categories, which infuriated De Gaulle. The General’s 
identity rested on restoring France’s greatness, which had been destroyed after the spring of 
1940. Being inferior to Churchill, especially in the ways he could not control, meant that De 
Gaulle felt small and powerless. Much of his resistance to following British orders, then, can be 
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Chapter 3 – Mers-el-Kébir: 
 
Among the many uncertainties the fall of France produced for the European order, the 
question of the French Navy was one of the most immediate. It was among the largest and most 
powerful in the world: smaller than its British, American, or Japanese counterparts, but larger 
still than the Italian fleet.1 It was not clear right away whether the navy would pledge its 
allegiance to Pétain’s government or to a foreign ally intent on resisting the Germans, like 
Britain. Churchill’s secretary Sir John Peck said that, if the Germans gained access to the French 
navy, it “would have destroyed the whole balance in the Mediterranean and in the world in 
fact.”2 Since the Germans were equipped with a relatively weak navy, access to the French fleet 
was essential for their plans in the Mediterranean. Specifically, the strong presence of the British 
navy required Germany to find a way to match them. Britain and Free France, for their part, 
understood this fact and knew that if the navy chose to ally with Germany then the Axis would 
be a tough force to match.  
A diary entry from the German Staff Operational Division from June 25, 1940 records 
the presence of both attitudes among French sailors: on one hand, many sailors “are undoubtedly 
resolved to carry out the orders of the Pétain government.” Yet, on the other, there were reports 
of vessels in both Casablanca and Turkey proclaiming their allegiance to Britain.3 Pétain 
obviously hoped they would stay loyal to France and the Germans also had a vested interest in 
preserving the French fleet. They believed that collaboration with the Vichy government meant 
the French navy, loyal to France, would be equally loyal to the Germans. Vichy disputed this 
assumption, evidenced by Admiral Darlan’s attitude toward French collaboration with Germany. 
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He did not like the Germans any better than the British, so he was not likely to hand over the 
fleet to either side easily. De Gaulle recognized this as well, writing that so long as the French 
Navy remained intact and under Darlan’s control, he would not surrender it.4 
The Armistice signed on June 22 between France and Germany included articles to 
demobilize French warships. This was good in principle for the Allies since it meant that neither 
Vichy nor Germany planned to use the navy against them. For Vichy, it was a major handicap 
because it meant that the French Navy could not defend itself if it were attacked. Darlan 
recognized this danger, so he quickly ordered his sailors to ensure that all warships “remain 
French, under French colors, with French crews in French ports, whether Metropolitan or 
colonial.” Additionally, he said the navy should resist at all costs handing over intact warships to 
the Allies, which meant either heading for the United States – which had not at this point joined 
the war – or even scuttling them if necessary. Finally, ships in any port were not to be used in 
operations against the Germans or Italians unless commanded otherwise.5 Darlan believed that 
the French Navy had a duty to remain loyal to France above all else, which included abiding by a 
policy of collaboration with the Germans. He said that a failure to do so was “against the 
interests of the country.”6 
From Churchill’s perspective, he was stuck between a rock and a hard place almost 
immediately following the Franco-German Armistice. On one hand, Britain still had diplomatic 
ties with metropolitan France at this point and it had just established a relationship with De 
Gaulle’s Free France. Both of these alliances limited Britain’s ability to forcefully take the fleet. 
However, Churchill was deeply afraid that the Germans would co-opt the French navy for 
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themselves and use it against Britain. With these concerns weighing on him, Churchill had the 
especially hard task as Prime Minister of balancing his responsibilities to English citizens, 
specifically concerning their safety, with his obligations to Britain’s allies.   
 
The Events 
The Mers-el-Kébir attack, also called Operation Catapult, occurred within weeks of the fall 
of France and both reignited Anglo-French competition and marked the beginning of the tense 
relationship between Churchill and De Gaulle that endured for the rest of the war. The British 
understood the importance of Mers-el-Kébir for 
its strategic geography and as the home of two 
of France’s best battle cruisers, the Dunkerque 
and the Strasbourg. Additionally, other 
important components of the French fleet in the 
Algerian port were the Bretagne and the 
Provence – two smaller but still powerful 
battleships – a seaplane tender, and six 
destroyers. By comparison, the British force 
that attacked was composed of 
the battlecruiser HMS Hood, the 
battleships HMS Valiant and Resolution, the 
aircraft carrier Ark Royal and an escort of 
cruisers and destroyers. The British had the advantage at Mers-el-Kébir in several capacities: 
they had more tonnage than the French; they were able to maneuver the narrow harbor, while the 
French fleet was anchored; and the French crews obviously did not expect an attack. 
Figure 3: Map of approximate positions of 
torpedoes and cruisers at Mers-el-Kébir. 
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The British plan was quite straightforward. First, they offered an ultimatum to the French 
Navy. A document from the Somerville Papers shows that they gave the Navy six hours to 
respond to the request to either sail for an Allied port or scuttle their ships.7 The nature of these 
original demands underlines the severity of the British fears of a powerful German Navy in the 
Mediterranean. It was not enough for Admiral Gensoul, who was in charge of the ships at Mers-
el-Kébir, to echo Darlan in promising not to turn over his ships to Germany if such 
circumstances arose. Likewise, the British did not trust that the conditions of the armistice would 
hold up if Germany came under military pressure in the region. For the British, the only options 
for dealing with the French navy were to control or destroy it. The rest of the operation 
illustrated this dichotomy because if the French refused to surrender, the British would attack 
and sink the fleet themselves. The disarmament clause of the armistice to which the French navy 
was subjected meant the British would open fire on what were essentially sitting ducks. 
General de Gaulle and Free France were completely absent from the planning process for 
Mers-el-Kébir. At the same time the British were planning the attack, they were also formalizing 
their relationship with De Gaulle and helping him establish a base for Free France in London. By 
the time the attack passed in early July, Britain had officially recognized Free France as a viable 
political entity representing French national interests.8 From De Gaulle’s perspective, since the 
future of the French navy logically fits in the category of “French national interest,” it follows 
that he should have been involved in the conversation. Further, his exclusion from the planning 
process symbolized for the first time that Britain would assert its own interests as more important 
than those of France. Whatever the implications for Churchill and his Cabinet, this was a fine 
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position to take because they were never going to help France at the cost of British interests. 
Unlike De Gaulle, they were able to call the shots in their favor because they had all the military 
supplies, money, and political power. Thus, De Gaulle’s absence from the decision-making 
phase is an early example of the asymmetric power dynamic between the General and the Prime 
Minister. 
After the British offered Gensoul their ultimatum, the French Admiral refused to answer 
it one way or the other. Lord Ismay said that this “spoke for his stubborn courage and the robust 
discipline of the French Navy, that in spite of the hopelessness of their position they did their 
duty as they saw it.”9 However, what the British failed to account for here was the position 
Gensoul was in. He was sandwiched between obedience to his own government in France and 
Britain’s insistence on resisting. All Gensoul wanted was for the French navy to act 
independently under a free French state; after the fall of France, of course, this was not possible, 
but he and Darlan disliked both options – Britain and Germany – for some sort of alliance.  
The Royal Navy assembled “Force H” to handle the attack, and placed at its helm 
Admiral James Somerville. On July 3, they arrived at Mers-el-Kébir. For Somerville, the most 
important ships whose capture or destruction should be prioritized were the largest cruisers in the 
fleet at Mers-el-Kébir, Dunkerque and Strasbourg; after their destruction, Somerville ordered his 
crew to inflict as much damage on the rest of the fleet as possible.10 Ultimately, Provence, 
Dunkerque, and the destroyer Mogador were damaged and run aground by their crews. 
Strasbourg and four destroyers managed to escape to the open sea, despite a barrage of attacks 
from British planes. Strasbourg reached Toulon July 4, marking a significant failure on the part 
of the British. Believing that the damage inflicted on Dunkerque and Provence was not serious, 
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aircraft from Ark Royal raided Mers-el-Kébir again on the morning of 8 July. A torpedo hit the 
patrol boat Terre-Neuve, which was moored alongside Dunkerque. Terre-Neuve quickly sank 
and the depth charges went off, causing serious damage to Dunkerque. Provence was also 
seriously damaged during the attack. The British succeeded in sinking Bretagne, the third-largest 
destroyer in the French fleet, by exploding it. The weather played a role in their success, as there 
was a “very thick haze up to 1,000 feet, above which visibility was extreme.”11 
At Mers-el-Kébir, the French navy suffered its worst losses of the war, which included 
1,297 sailors killed and an additional 351 wounded.12 An article from The Times in London 
called it “melancholy victory” for Britain, which felt conflicted about attacking the demobilized 
French. In any case, they did succeed at placing the most important components of the fleet 
beyond Hitler’s reach, which was their original goal.13 
 
Reactions 
It is important to keep in mind that there were few people among both the British 
government and Free France who enthusiastically supported the attack at Mers-el-Kébir. The 
most common narrative was that it was a necessary evil in preventing Hitler from making 
significant gains in Africa.14 For example, the Vice Admiral Commanding of the North Atlantic 
wrote that he “was absolutely opposed to the use of force, that the French would probably fight 
and that Admiral Gensoul had said he would submit to no other power taking control of his 
ships.” He continued, saying that it was revealed at a meeting several days before the attack that 
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“all the Flag Officers and Captains present were opposed to the use of force” and that Somerville 
himself called the plans “utterly repugnant.”15 At the same time, the operation was necessary 
from the British perspective because they believed it was “delusional” for France to think it 
could be restored through its cooperation with the Axis.16 In a note from the Admiralty to 
Commanding Officer of Force H, the British justified their decision to sink the fleet by saying 
“whatever is left to France, if anything, will only be held on sufferance until Germany is 
defeated. How much better, therefore, to fight on with us for the restoration of the French 
Empire.”17  
Even still, Mers-el-Kébir was not an operation in which the British took any pride. They 
had never previously made war on a defeated ally and an article in The Daily Telegraph called it 
an “inexorable” duty to the common goals of the war. The Telegraph additionally claimed that 
the attack was forced upon the British.18 Churchill is said to have been physically sick when he 
heard the news and he later described it as he most “unnatural and painful decision” in which he 
had ever been involved.19 However, the title of a piece published in the British newspaper News 
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Chronicle sums up the perspective felt by both the British and Free French: “Horrible – But 
Necessary.” The paper wrote that it was one of the most “tragic events in history;” at the same 
time, it emphasized how both Churchill and De Gaulle felt that if that French fleet had fallen 
intact into German hands, they would have lost the war. That article also reflected the sentiments 
of the British population, saying that the British were: 
fighting for our very existence, and for more than that – for Europe’s resurrection. We believe 
that the present generation of Frenchmen will live to remember the action at Oran not with 
bitterness but with thankfulness, since it may well be the means of their eventual salvation.20 
It is hard to overemphasize the connection between saving France and keeping the French Navy 
out of Germany’s control. For Britain, that was the single line of logic running through the plans 
to attack the fleet at Mers-el-Kébir. The Telegraph wrote that the victory had “confirmed our 
command of the sea and shown the supreme efficiency and tremendous striking power of our 
Navy.”21 Mers-el-Kébir was one sacrifice – albeit a major one – to ensure that Germany would 
not move further into Africa at the expense of the French. 
Mers-el-Kébir elicited a complicated response from De Gaulle. Again, he was unaware that 
the attack was happening and was only informed about it after its completion. While the British 
were making these plans, De Gaulle was preoccupied trying to recruit forces to join Free France 
and to establish himself in London. In the last few weeks of June, after he addressed the French 
Empire on the radio on June 18, French people poured into Britain to support the General. He 
received letters of support and requests for enlistment. Then, he writes that “a lamentable event 
occurred to stop the stream.” This event, of course, refers to Mers-el-Kébir. In London the 
official communiqués and the newspapers tended to represent this series of aggressions as a sort 
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of naval victory. He called it a “terrible blow to our hopes,” after which many previously-
enthusiastic volunteers “turned on their heels.” Solange Troisier, a French medical student who 
later joined the Resistance, said “Mers-el-Kébir m’a terriblement frappée ; [j’avais] l’impression 
aussi que la France était abaissée.”22 Churchill’s secretary Sir John Peck additionally remarked 
that “France was outraged” and “many [French people] felt they could not join De Gaulle and his 
British allies.”23 This was a detrimental omen to the future of Free France: if De Gaulle could not 
build up support, which Mers-el-Kébir appeared to make clear, his efforts to save France would 
be at best delayed or more difficult, or at worse halted completely.24 
Initially, Mers-el-Kébir deeply disturbed De Gaulle, who called it “odious” and 
“particularly cruel” in various speeches and his memoirs.25 He also described the attack as 
fratricidal and showing the “violence of the Anglo-Saxon character.”26 De Gaulle saw “the fear 
caused by the danger they [the British] were in, the stale reek of an old naval rivalry, and the 
resentments accumulated since the beginning of the Battle of France and brought to the point of 
paroxysm with the armistice concluded by Vichy” reflected in the attack. Edward Spears 
remarked that De Gaulle also viewed the attack as an attempt to grab French territory. He said 
De Gaulle “could never accept that we had no territorial ambitions at France’s expense,” and that 
he always believed the British “would succumb to the temptation to help [themselves] to some 
tempting morsel of the French Empire.”27 These sentiments reflect both De Gaulle’s staunch 
Anglophobia and fears among the French that the British were out to conquer them. More than 
just the principle of the British attacking French territory, however, Mers-el-Kébir also infuriated 
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De Gaulle because he felt like it could have been avoided if the British had listened to him. He 
writes in his memoirs that “It had never, though, been likely that the French Fleet would of itself 
open hostilities against the British. Ever since my arrival in London I had stressed this both to the 
British Government and to the Admiralty.” Darlan would not easily surrender control of the navy 
and told that to Lord Lloyd, the British Minister for Colonies, and Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, 
the First Sea Lord, when they went to Bordeaux back in June. Additionally, he stressed that the 
terms of the armistice included no direct provision entitling the Germans to lay hands on the 
French fleet. In contrast to the British, who explicitly did not trust the Germans to hold up this 
part of the armistice, De Gaulle seemed to believe they would.28  
Despite his initial reactions, De Gaulle did agree with the British opinion that sinking the 
fleet was the lesser of two evils; it would have been far more dangerous if the French Navy had 
come under Germany’s control, especially since the opinion in Vichy was that the Empire was 
France’s “last card” and that “everything must be done to keep it alive.”29 In this sense, he 
recognizes the incompatibility of his goals and those of Britain. He writes that: 
In spite of the pain and anger into which I and my companions were plunged by the tragedy of 
Mers-el-Kébir, by the behavior of the British and by the way they gloried in it, I considered that 
the saving of France ranked above everything, even above the fate of her ships, and that our duty 
was still to go on with the fight.30  
This passage encapsulates the mental tug-of-war De Gaulle endured in trying to come to terms 
with results of Catapult. On one hand, it is a national tragedy, an attack on French sailors, French 
territory, and French warships. It also highlights De Gaulle’s Anglophobia and brings to light the 
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uncertainty he felt about whether or not the British were actively trying to pick apart the French 
Empire, a notion always present in his dealings with the British. Yet, on the other hand, it shows 
how De Gaulle looked past all of these losses and saw the attack as a bigger victory for France’s 
ultimate liberation. While he may have disagreed with British ideas for achieving this war aim, 
he still felt that Mers-el-Kébir serviced French interests in the end.31  
The incident at Mers-el-Kébir was not hailed as a proud victory by the British and clearly 
not by the Free French. Ironically, the attack served to push the French navy willingly into the 
service of Vichy. It reinforced the emerging idea that the British attacked the navy because they 
felt threatened by the power the French projected. As a result, German and Italian authorities 
were more receptive to Vichy’s naval requirement and insisted less and less on French 
disarmament.32 Nevertheless, both Churchill and De Gaulle viewed the British actions as nothing 
more than duty to achieving a common goal: to prevent the French fleet from falling into the 
Germans’ hands. It was surely a painful realization for De Gaulle, but Mers-el-Kébir underlined 
their mutual dependence on each other to achieve their war aims. Several days following the 
attack, he said of the Free French-British alliance: “Ils succomberont tous les deux ou bien ils 
gagneront ensemble.”33 Since 1940, the French people have viewed the attack as a massacre akin 
to Pearl Harbor.34 It remains an important moment in French mythology and in Anglo-French 
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32 Thomas, “After Mers-el-Kébir,” 649. 
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relations more broadly. Yet, there was still hope, as was featured in the Telegraph article, that 
France would “clear her national honor and save herself as she has done before.”35  
 
Impacts on Relations 
For officials in metropolitan France, the event appeared unexpected and ruthless, but 
carried with it major political, military, and symbolic repercussions. Vichy severed diplomatic 
relations with Britain on July 8, less than a week after the attack. It further enflamed anti-English 
feelings among French civilians and officials and solidified that, even if Britain could gain 
control of the fleet, the Navy itself would stay loyal to Vichy.36 French writer André Gide 
compared England and France to “two puppets in the hands of Hitler, who now amuses himself, 
after having conquered France, by aligning against her, her ally of yesterday.”37 Moreover, in the 
eyes of the British, the campaign was another display of France’s weakness. Coming right on the 
heels of France’s horrible defeat by the Germans, Mers-el-Kébir represented the French being 
beaten – by a friend, no less – when they were already down.  
This event occupies a complicated place in the relations between Free France and Britain. 
The War Cabinet certainly recognized that it undermined their ability to rally support on the 
mainland for French resistance, given the feeling among the French that they had been brutally 
defeated back to back. They maintained the position that it “is from Hitler and not from France 
that the British Navy has taken the French Fleet.”38 For the most part, De Gaulle and the Free 
French recognized this as well, even though it was difficult to come to that conclusion.  
                                                        
35 “An Inexorable Duty: Securing the French Fleet,” The Daily Telegraph, July 5, 1940, LH 15/4/389, 
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36 Thomas, “After Mers-el-Kébir,” 651, 649, 646; Upward, “Ordinary Sailors,” 229. 
37 Mangold, Britain and the Defeated French, 41, 42. 
38 “Horrible – But Necessary,” News Chronicle, July 5, 1940, LH 15/4/389, Liddell Hart Centre for 
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Importantly, the aftermath of Mers-el-Kébir actually strengthened support for De 
Gaulle’s leadership among some British officials. In a note from Edward Spears to Churchill, 
Spears wrote that De Gaulle represented a refreshing change for French resistors. He claimed 
that, while experienced politicians would have been “immensely valuable” following the fall of 
France, the devastation of Mers-el-Kébir called for a leader willing to ignore the rules of politics 
and fight for their survival. De Gaulle’s willingness to act as a rebel was attractive both for the 
British and for the French resistors. Thus, Spears believed that “the need for hope in mankind is 
such that the unsophisticated will be tempted to believe in a newcomer” like De Gaulle.39 
Although limiting De Gaulle’s appeal only to the “unsophisticated” is a rather backhanded 
compliment, it reflects the chaos and desperation of the situation. Similarly, Lord Avon wrote 
that the aftermath of this campaign was when he realized De Gaulle was “the Frenchman for us.” 
He wrote 
Well I think we felt it mainly from some things he said and did when he got here, the spirit in 
which he acted, and particularly, of course, after that tragic action we had to take against the 
French fleet [at Mers-el-Kébir]. That was terribly tough for De Gaulle, of course, and they hated 
it. He did take it well, he did face up to it. I think that was probably the moment when we felt he 
was a man who would go through with it whatever happened.40  
Thus, in some ways De Gaulle surprisingly emerged better off from the events that transpired in 
Algeria in early July. He represented a fierce, if unpredictable, patriot who inspired the French 
resistors in ways the English politicians could not.  
In terms of the personal relationship between De Gaulle and Churchill, Mers-el-Kébir 
represented the bitter end of their so-called honeymoon phase. In other words, it was the first 
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40 “Constable of France: De Gaulle Actuality,” November 6, 1958, LH 15/5/516, Liddell Hart Centre for 
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major moment in their alliance when they realized not all of their goals and interests perfectly 
overlapped. While they both wanted France’s greatness restored and for Germany to be defeated, 
they differed over how to achieve those aims. Since they both recognized they had to prevent 
Germany from obtaining control over the French Fleet, neither blamed the other for the 
campaign; but, they certainly felt its impacts cut deeply. French historian Christian Destremau 
wrote that “il mettra longtemps à se remettre d’avoir été contraint de prendre la décision de 
bombarder la flotte d’un pays qui était encore il y a peu le principal allié du Royaume-Uni.”41 De 
Gaulle himself wondered if he could continue working with Churchill. He naturally held 
Churchill, as Britain’s leader, responsible for its actions and behavior. Further, when De Gaulle 
had a problem, it was certainly easier to take it up with Churchill rather than all of Britain, the 
whole British military, or Parliament. In this sense, De Gaulle personified British politics in 
Churchill himself. However painful Mers-el-Kébir was, he decided that the liberation of France 
depended on Britain’s survival. Even though their strategies might differ, De Gaulle and 
Churchill did have the same end goals.42 
In the weeks following Mers-el-Kébir, the British and Free French prepared to land at 
Dakar in late September. French West Africa was the next logical step for the British and Free 
French for a handful of reasons. Generally, it was the part of the French Empire that provided a 
lot of promising support for Free France. Additionally, the German presence in West Africa was 
smaller than in North Africa or the Middle East, and certainly mainland France, so Churchill and 
De Gaulle believed that they would face less, or at least weaker, resistance. After a series of 
debates among the military planners, Dakar became the first target for their African campaign. 
Like Mers-el-Kébir, it was an important port city on the Atlantic coast and was the home of the 
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Richelieu, one of the most advanced battleships in the world; taking it from Vichy’s hands was a 
major operational goal.  
The tragic loss of the French Fleet continued to sting both Churchill and De Gaulle as 
they planned Dakar. Mers-el-Kébir foreshadowed, or perhaps caused, De Gaulle to become more 
assertive in his defense of France’s interests when working with the British in future campaigns. 
He had to worry about his credibility if the British kept killing Frenchmen and he wanted to 
avoid losing more French materials and territory to the British. However, this exacerbated 
frustrations on the part of the British, who felt that De Gaulle became increasingly impossible to 
work with. Moreover, the tangible differences between Free France and Britain became 
important markers in their statuses. At this point, Free France was basically just De Gaulle and a 
few other French patriots participating to some extent in British affairs. Contrarily, Britain was 
an actual country: it had millions of people and defined borders to defend. Naturally, this meant 
that Churchill and De Gaulle had different, even conflicting, priorities and the British were 
unable – and unwilling – to entertain all of De Gaulle’s ideas and requests. This irritated the 
General, who began to feel the impacts of the inferior position to which the British had relegated 
him. Consequently, his tensions with Churchill grew stronger. While their partnership did not 
immediately worsen after Mers-el-Kébir, as it did after other campaigns, the sinking of the 
French Fleet emphasized that their relationship was marked by unequal status and conflicting 
war goals. 
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Chapter 4 – Dakar: 
De Gaulle struggled to come to terms with Mers-el-Kébir; moving forward from it, he 
sought a stronger position as a decision-maker in British political and military affairs in order to 
defend French interests. His partnership with the British was critical in this regard. De Gaulle 
saw Africa as the theater to concentrate Free French operations in the war and wanted to move 
his headquarters there. In a telegram to Churchill from September 17, De Gaulle wrote: 
C’est même d’une importance plus grande encore du point de vue de la conduite générale de la 
guerre, qui exige, à mon avis, que les Alliés s’assurent le contrôle, avant l’ennemi, des bases 
aériennes, navales, et militaires de l’Afrique française… Je demande la coopération immédiate 
des forces britanniques aériennes et navales ici présentes.1  
He believed that “in the vast spaces of Africa,” Free France could establish itself, which De 
Gaulle believed would help “reverse the balance of forces” in Africa and contribute to the 
elimination of Vichy and the Germans.2 De Gaulle’s goal of claiming Africa also reflected the 
fact that in order for Free France to play an active military role in the war, they depended on 
France’s colonial empire. If De Gaulle could rally France’s African colonies instead to support 
Free France, he would have access to the manpower, resources, and territory vital for giving him 
the legitimacy he needed. This, he believed, would prove to the British that Free France was 
worth supporting because they would continue to fight. If he had French Africa and Britain 
behind him, De Gaulle felt he could surely restore France to its former greatness, which was his 
primary war goal. 
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De Gaulle saw an opportunity to do so chiefly in French-controlled Equatorial Africa, 
specifically in Chad.3 In North and West Africa, he believed he would have encountered a 
stronger opposition to the Free French because those territories were more important to both the 
Germans and Vichy. He wrote in his memoirs that the authorities in West Africa were strongly 
centralized and “closely linked with [those] of North Africa.” Furthermore, the military resources 
in North and West Africa were more considerable than those in Equatorial Africa. By contrast, 
the equatorial region was much more rural and had less strategic significance for either Germany 
or Vichy, notably in terms of the number of important ports. He thought that rallying the 
Cameroons, Chad, Gabon, Guinea, and the Congo would not require much of a military 
engagement at all, except perhaps in Gabon. Even if he did need to use force, he believed it 
would still be more worthwhile to target Equatorial Africa because an armed conflict in North or 
West Africa would be a more prolonged and costly effort.4 
De Gaulle initially proposed to the War Cabinet a landing at Conakry in Guinea, almost 
500 miles south of Dakar and 50 miles north of British Sierra Leone. He believed that landing 
there first would be strategic because he could assemble Free French troops from the Guineans, 
who had already pledged their support for him. With an army, they could then take advantage of 
the railways and roads for a march on Dakar, instead of a naval operation.5 However, he did 
recognize the strength of the French navy at Dakar and knew that Free France would need to 
eliminate that threat before landing anywhere else on the continent. The British considered De 
Gaulle’s landing at Conakry too slow an undertaking to be practical. Churchill explained that, 
even though he wanted to provide de Gaulle with a large naval contingency, British ships could 
not stay off the coast of Africa for as long as De Gaulle’s plan would have required. The British 
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navy was needed in England and the Mediterranean, both of which were more pressing concerns 
for Churchill. At a meeting on August 6, 1940, Churchill convinced De Gaulle to consider Dakar 
as an alternative.6  
Dakar was an important port city in Vichy French-controlled West Africa. Like all of the 
French territories during this period, both Churchill and De Gaulle agreed that the British and 
Free French needed to seize control from Vichy, for fear that Vichy would cede control to the 
Germans. Beyond just keeping Dakar out of German hands, Churchill and De Gaulle both 
recognized that it possessed the 
best equipped and most modern 
harbor in the area. It also 
commanded British imperial 
communications routes around the 
Cape to the Middle and Far East, 
which had become of critical 
importance now that the 
Mediterranean was closed to 
British convoys. Geographically, 
it was closer to the Western Hemisphere, (specifically the US) than other French African ports. 
The Richelieu, one of France’s most modern battleships, was stationed at Dakar, so a seizure of 
the port would also bring that vessel under British control. Finally, a victory in Vichy territory 
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Figure 4: Map of French West Africa, 1940. 
Sullivan__    
 
74 
would boost prestige, morale, and support for the Free French, thereby improving De Gaulle’s 
position in West Africa.7 In his memoirs, De Gaulle recalls:  
‘We must,’ [Churchill] said to me, ‘together gain control of Dakar. For you it is capital. For if the 
business goes well, it means that larger French forces are brought back into the war. It is very 
important for us. For to be able to use Dakar as a base would make a great many things easier in 
the hard Battle of the Atlantic. 8  
More than anything, gaining control of Dakar would degrade Vichy’s influence in Africa. While 
De Gaulle supported the operation, he also feared that, should they succeed together, Britain 
might still take over the territories to serve its own interests. The General’s fear that Britain was 
intent on taking the French empire for itself appears often in his collaboration with Churchill. He 
wrote in his memoirs that landing in Africa would defend France’s possession from both 
England and the United States. Most importantly, wresting Africa from Vichy would “wrench 
Free France free from exile and install her in full sovereignty on national territory.”9  
By August, De Gaulle had ample reason to believe a Free French landing in Africa would 
be a successful means of recruiting support. The Free French experienced their “Three Glorious 
Days” between August 26-28, during which Chad, the Cameroons, and the Congo all pledged 
their support to Free France. For De Gaulle, this was important for two reasons. First, the 
rallying of Equatorial Africa meant he was no longer, in Lacouture’s words, “a squatter in 
London. In other words, Free France was picking up momentum now that De Gaulle had a large 
swath of territory to base himself and his operations, as well as local people willing to join the 
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Free French Forces. This adds substance to the independence of Free France because it was the 
local African administrations, not Britain, who gave De Gaulle the resources he needed. In other 
words, out from under Britain’s authority, Free France could exercise the autonomy De Gaulle 
was denied in London. Second, the fact that these colonies offered their support “without a drop 
of blood having been shed” gave De Gaulle an important confidence boost. He could show 
Britain that people in Africa wanted to fight with Free France; Britain could support De Gaulle’s 
operations there without costing them much.10 While Equatorial Africa pledged their support to 
Free France after the British and De Gaulle had decided to land at Dakar, these new supporters 
assured the military planners that an African landing was going to be successful. 
 
The Events 
On August 20, 1940, Churchill, De Gaulle, and the British Chiefs of Staff solidified the 
plan for the landing at Dakar, also known as Operation Menace. Their aim was to capture Dakar 
and replace the pro-Vichy administration with a pro-British, pro-Free French government in the 
hopes of recruiting more support for the Free French. The joint operation was led by British 
Admiral John Cunningham and Charles de Gaulle. Churchill summarized the plan as follows:  
The Anglo-French Armada would arrive at Dakar at dawn, aircraft would drop streamers and 
leaflets over the town, the British squadron would remain over the horizon, and French ships 
would come towards the port. An emissary, in a picket boat flying the Tricolor and a white flag, 
would go into the harbor with a letter to the Governor saying that General de Gaulle and his Free 
French troops had arrived. General de Gaulle would stress in the letter that he had come to free 
Dakar from the danger of imminent German aggression and it was bringing food and succor to 
the garrison and inhabitants. If the Governor was amenable, all would be well; if not, and the 
coast defenses opened fire, the British squadrons would close in. If the opposition continued, the 
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British warships would open fire on the French gun positions, but with the utmost restraint. If 
determined opposition was met with, the British forces would use all means to break down 
resistance. It was essential that the operation should be completed, and General de Gaulle master 
of Dakar, by nightfall. General de Gaulle expressed his agreement.11 
The success of Operation Menace was contingent upon the British and De Gaulle being 
welcomed as liberators in Dakar.  
At first, the leadership believed they would be supported by the French West Africans. 
Watson wrote: 
All the Intelligence Reports received before the arrival of the Vichy cruisers tended to indicate 
that the Free French chances of success were considerable. The description of the feeling at Dakar 
given in a report from the British Consul, at St.-Vincent, 
which we received on the 17th [of August], was probably 
very near the truth. It said that popular feeling was strongly 
in favor of General de Gaulle, and that if he showed firm 
leadership he would gain considerable local support.12 
The Allies were clearly optimistic about their prospects in 
Dakar. Xavier de la Chevalerie of the Free French Army said 
“each of us had two pairs of shorts and two shirts, and we 
were forbidden to wear the second set so that they would be 
absolutely clean for us to parade in Dakar.”13  
However, intelligence received closer to the departure of the mission contradicted this 
narrative. On August 28, the British realized that the French in West Africa would not welcome 
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De Gaulle and that “serious resistance was likely to be encountered.”14 More than just the local 
opposition, Vichy posed a threat to the operation as well. Vichy France had sent six ships to 
Douala to recapture French Equatorial Africa, which had shifted sides to support the Free 
French. The British stationed at Gibraltar allowed them to pass through. The British and De 
Gaulle were concerned that the Vichy fleet would intercept their own ships on the way to Dakar. 
If the ships from Toulon sailed straight through to Douala, then the British and Free French 
might have had enough guns to fight the forces already in Dakar as they expected. If the Vichy 
fleet diverted towards West Africa instead, De Gaulle’s forces risked being outgunned. When the 
Vichy squadron turned towards Dakar, the Menace leadership had to decide whether or not to 
continue. 
On September 16, the War Cabinet in London gave orders to De Gaulle to call off the 
mission and instead land in the Cameroons to increase Free French influence in equatorial 
Africa.15 De Gaulle vehemently objected to this change in plan and appealed to Churchill for 
permission to continue towards Dakar. He wrote in his memoirs that, even though the situation 
looked dim, he believed they “ought in spite of everything…try to enter Dakar.” De Gaulle 
continued, saying that the rallying two weeks earlier of much of Equatorial Africa had “filled me 
with a secret hope.” 16 De Gaulle’s desire to continue towards Dakar despite all of the signs 
telling him to turn around perhaps reflects his desperation for a Free French military victory. 
Such a victory would give him a certain amount of legitimacy, both in the eyes of his new 
supporters in Africa and the British. Watson recalled De Gaulle arguing that “It was more 
important still…for the future development of the war, that the Allies should forestall possible 
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moves of the enemy by establishing themselves securely in the French Naval, Military and 
Airforce bases.”17 If Menace succeeded in the face of a robust Vichy and local opposition, De 
Gaulle believed he would inspire the rest of France’s African colonies to pledge their support to 
Free France.18 Thus, the British commanders and De Gaulle continued with the operation against 
orders from London.  
On September 23, 1940, British and Free French forces arrived at Dakar. The Free 
French provided three sloops (the Savorgnan de Brazza, the Commandant Duboc, and the 
Commandant Dominé), two trawlers (the Vaillant and the Viking), four cargo boats carrying 
heavy materials, and two Dutch liners (the Penland and the Westerland), as well as several 
thousand men.19 The British squadron had two battleships (the Barham and the Resolution), four 
cruisers (including the Cumberland), the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, some destroyers, and a 
tanker.20 
When the fleet arrived, they faced poor weather conditions that further impeded their 
operation. The heavy fog, to Watson, “enveloped us unexpectedly and contrary to all the weather 
forecasts. It robbed the expedition of the psychological effect which the sight of the fleet was 
expected to produce, and the lack of visibility greatly hampered all movements at sea and in the 
air, as well as the shooting of the Fleet.”21 Nevertheless, they continued towards shore. Contrary 
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to the plan – but in line with the intelligence received shortly before their arrival – De Gaulle and 
his forces were welcomed not as liberators, but as enemies. De Gaulle had hoped to land in 
Dakar and attempt to persuade the authorities there to join forces with Free France. However, 
Vichy ships began firing on the Allied vessels, making any efforts at negotiation impossible.22 
For the next two days, British and Free French ships continued to attack the port, but Vichy 
never backed down. De Gaulle described the end of the battle as follows: 
I saw that we ran a serious risk of having one of our troopships sunk in sight of land, before we 
had had a chance even to open negotiations with the authorities on shore. I therefore decided to 
withdraw and to try our luck at Rufisque, six 
miles along the coast from Dakar. Here we 
tried to land from boats, and our pilots also 
landed on the airfield. But here again our 
landing was attempted without adequate 
naval protection. Our boats were sunk, our 
men and pilots were taken prisoner. So, in 
bitter disappointment, we called the operation 
off and sailed southwards.23 
The withdrawal of their ships signaled a terrible 
defeat.24 During the battle, two Vichy submarines, Persée and Ajax, were sunk and the destroyer 
Audacieux was damaged. On the Allied side, HMS Resolution was torpedoed and Barham was 
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hit by forces on the coast. Two cruisers, Australia and Cumberland, were also severely damaged. 
While the British and Free French successfully targeted several of Vichy’s most important ships, 
the fact that land batteries continued to fire on them made the operation too costly and dangerous 
to continue. Despite De Gaulle’s disagreement, Cunningham called off the remainder of the 
mission and their squadrons sailed toward Freetown to escape. Failing in their main operational 
goal, they left Dakar in Vichy hands and susceptible to German influence.  
 
Failure 
Historian Peter Mangold writes that Operation Menace had “all the hallmarks of a 
Churchillian adventure: short on detailed planning and long on wishful-thinking.”25 For his part, 
Churchill was “most distressed” at the failure of the Dakar operation and it heightened tensions 
between him and De Gaulle significantly, while also creating a disastrous impression of the 
General.26 Both the British and American Press wholly blamed De Gaulle for the failure. They 
wrote that it was he who thought of the “absurd adventure” in the first place and that he misled 
the British with imaginative reports of the situation in Dakar. De Gaulle was accused of 
quixotically insisting on the attack without regard for the reality on the ground: Dakar was pro-
Vichy. Especially after the Vichy squadron from Toulon surprisingly arrived in West Africa, De 
Gaulle should have known the mission was doomed.27  
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Bad communication and intelligence played a large part in the failure at Dakar. De Gaulle 
described “a failure to co-ordinate our naval and land operations” and reported that the Allies did 
not “consider fully the activities of the land batteries, and the effect that bombardment from the 
shore would have on our attempts at landing.”28 J.A. Watson, Spears’ assistant, wrote: 
A feeling arose, rightly or wrongly, that security in the Free French Forces was not all that it 
should have been, and, as a result of this, information that would otherwise have been imparted to 
them was kept secret. This became a source of friction between the British and free French 
authorities. 29 
Watson’s reflections convey that the British blamed the Free French, specifically De Gaulle, for 
bad communication.  
The unexpected Vichy presence also contributed to the fiasco at Dakar. Mangold claims 
that the key British mistake was the “failure to appreciate that Vichy continued to command the 
loyalty of its troops and that they would resolutely resist incursions into the French Empire.”30 
The dynamic of the Free French fighting the Vichy French made the mission more difficult. On 
one hand, the author of a Daily Telegraph article published a few days after the attack wrote:  “It 
is easy to understand the extreme reluctance of Frenchmen to fire on other Frenchmen. The 
reluctance is equally felt by the British armed forces, who do not forget that so recently the 
soldiers and sailors of France were their comrades and allies.”31 The General also made a 
                                                        
that Menace “had only strengthened His Majesty’s Government in the confidence they extended to 
General de Gaulle.” At the same time, it was still a catastrophe and Churchill could only do so much to 
defend De Gaulle’s leadership. Churchill doubted De Gaulle’s ability to rally French support in West 
Africa and was not determined to let him keep trying with British sailors. 
28 George Slocombe, “First interview with de Gaulle since Dakar,” The Sunday Express, December 1, 
1940, LH 15/4/390, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College, London.; Kersaudy, 
Churchill and De Gaulle, 98. 
29 Colonel J.A. Watson, OBE, “Dakar Operation,” 1962. [O] 07/1187 No. 12(5C261).3, Imperial War 
Museum, London: 41, 5. 
30 Mangold, Britain and the Defeated French, 53. 
31 “The Failure at Dakar,” The Daily Telegraph, September 27, 1940, LH 15/4/390, Liddell Hart Centre 
for Military Archives, King’s College, London.; Upward, “Ordinary Sailors,” 242. 
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fundamental miscalculation of support for the Free French and British in Dakar. Watson agreed 
that misunderstanding the attitudes of the French in West Africa was important and credited the 
main reason behind Dakar’s failure to this “pro-Vichy, anti-De Gaulle and anti-British spirit 
infused into the population and the defenses of Dakar following upon the arrival there of the 
Vichy cruiser.”32  
 
Reactions 
Close on the heels of Mers-el-Kébir, Dakar presented another challenge in De Gaulle’s 
relationship with the British. It was a decisive defeat that implicated the stability of the Free 
French movement, Vichy’s influence in Africa, and Churchill and De Gaulle’s personal 
relationship moving forward. The command during Menace deliberately disobeyed orders from 
London to call off the mission, for which they paid dearly with the destruction of their ships and 
the humiliation of their retreat. The General hoped that a victory in Dakar would make him seem 
like a hero in the eyes of the British. Instead, its failure made De Gaulle appear as a rebel not in 
tune with the costs of taking such risks.33 Jean Lacouture wrotes that De Gaulle was “never 
entirely happy again” and that the fiasco was a source of personal humiliation.34 
It would have been an easy moment for De Gaulle to give up as it reinforced the bitter 
lesson that support in the empire for Pétain and his government was too strong; Churchill had 
British troops spread thinly on multiple fronts and the Free French had little to offer from the 
beginning.35 In the immediate aftermath of Dakar, De Gaulle was depressed by the results. He 
receded from the public eye and several months passed before he gave his first interview about 
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the campaign in December 1940. He wrote that “The days which followed were cruel for me. I 
went through what a man must feel when an earthquake shakes his house brutally and he 
receives on his head the rain of tiles falling from the roof.”36 There was also a degree of 
symbolism behind the operation: aboard the Westerland, De Gaulle realized it was a foreign ship, 
not a French one, that carried “the fortunes of France.”37 He could not escape his dependence on 
the British and perhaps felt motivated to try to land at Dakar in order to change this.  
Of course, De Gaulle being who he was, he pushed on. Free French soldier Jean Simon 
said in the documentary De Gaulle and France that, even though morale was very low after 
Dakar, De Gaulle remained positive; he told his troops that “this is only a temporary setback.” 
Another soldier, Xavier de la Chevalerie, called his conviction and audacity “seductive” and, 
despite the terrible blow Dakar dealt to De Gaulle, his response “reinforced our faith in him.”38 
De Gaulle himself declared the “unhappy incident…[would] make no difference to our ultimate 
victory.”39 His attitude also impressed some members of the British leadership. Vice Admiral 
Cunningham remarked that his reaction “when he was naturally suffering from the terrible 
disappointment…was that of a great man.”40 Watson also noted that 
General de Gaulle realized, as we all did, that the failure of the Expedition would be exploited to 
the full by his enemies both at home and abroad, and had placed his newly created Free French 
Movement and all that it meant in jeopardy before it had hardly got into his stride…A weaker 
man might have given up in despair, but General de Gaulle was no weakling and he was 
determined to win through, come what might. His courage, determination, and unflinching 
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attitude as he calmly discussed the pros and cons of the next move with General Spears…were 
quite admirable.41  
De Gaulle’s optimism reflected his fierce pride and patriotism. The General believed the only 
reason to stop fighting was death. He wholeheartedly believed his makeshift Free French Army 
would triumph.  
This starkly contrasted with De Gaulle’s view towards his Vichy counterparts, whose 
surrender to the Germans back in June was a travesty and a sign of cowardice. Edward Spears 
said this all-or-nothing spirit made De Gaulle seem like “more of a gambler” because he was 
willing to take more risks than British leaders.42 As painful as the loss at Dakar was, as hard as it 
was to justify the actions at Mers-el-Kébir, nothing was more difficult for the General than 
coming to terms with France’s embarrassing defeat. Yet, De Gaulle’s attitude indicates his belief 
that if he did not vouch for France’s interests, nobody would. He became increasingly stubborn 
after Dakar and demanded more from the British. Watson comments on perceptions of De 
Gaulle’s personality in this context, saying that the popular image of De Gaulle as “a dour 
individual with no sense of humor” came about because “he had nothing much to be cheerful 
about during the war.”43 Each loss certainly hardened De Gaulle, but continued to motivate him 
to achieve his war goals.  
 
 
Relations after Dakar 
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The failure at Dakar was damaging to the stability of Free France. De Gaulle believed it 
dashed all hopes of rallying West and North Africa on their behalf and it discouraged many 
Frenchmen from joining his forces, which comforted many more in their hostility to his cause.44 
The British came to view De Gaulle and Free France as stand-offish at best and at worst 
obstructive. Frenchmen, in their experience, could not be trusted and the General’s 
insubordination was profoundly frustrating.45 The British public largely viewed Free France with 
“the same lack of confidence previously reserved for Vichy.”46 Watson’s reflections on British-
Free French relations more broadly is worth quoting in its entirety: 
[…C]lashes…so often marred our relations with the Free French. To this day I am persuaded that 
while many of these may have been justified by the overwhelming necessity for protecting British 
interests, others could well have been avoided if some of our people in high places had been free 
to be more co-operative, and had been more familiar with the French language, and French affairs 
in general. The situation was, admittedly, a delicate one. The British Government could hardly 
afford to antagonize the Vichy Government at that stage, particularly having regard to the fact 
that America had an Ambassador at Vichy and did not take the Free French Movement very 
seriously. On the other hand, the British Government had recognized General de Gaulle as head 
of the Free French Movement, and the General was entitled to expect help and co-operation. I 
think it is fair comment to say that whereas Mr. Winston Churchill, who was accountable only to 
Parliament, understood General de Gaulle’s situations and aims, certain British high officials and 
Service Chiefs at home and abroad, who were answerable to for their actions to higher authority, 
did not understand very well and found it more compatible with their responsibilities to defend 
British interests to the exclusion of all others, including General de Gaulle’s, than to follow a 
more difficult path. Hence certain clashes, which as I say could have been avoided, for when 
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General de Gaulle considered that the life or death of his Movement were at stake and insisted on 
having his way he was usually given way to, but naturally enough felt little gratitude for gains 
obtained in this manner. Another deterrent to over-friendliness on the part of the British was, of 
course, the attitude of America, which for years viewed General de Gaulle and his Movement 
with suspicion…To this day I feel that, however friendly his sentiments may be towards England, 
he cannot really have quite forgotten certain rebuffs – not to say humiliations – which he 
suffered, at times quite unnecessarily, during the war. He is only human, after all.47  
This passage is sympathetic towards De Gaulle and his precarious position after Dakar. It 
highlights De Gaulle’s powerlessness to push for French interests when they conflicted with 
British war aims. Dakar was a stunning example: Britain’s interest in controlling French Africa 
was not to install De Gaulle as its leader, but rather to ensure that the Axis had no access to the 
resources and ports there. De Gaulle wanted to keep Vichy and the Germans out as well, but 
cared much more about replacing the authorities in Africa with pro-Free French leaders. Britain 
was supportive of De Gaulle until his plan began costing them ships and manpower. The choice 
to retreat was a unilateral decision made by British Admiral Cunningham, regardless of the fact 
that De Gaulle – who was supposed to have power as a commander of the operation – disagreed. 
While Menace was a defeat for Britain, too, the impacts were less significant than they were for 
De Gaulle, who felt the loss was both a matter of life or death for Free France and a personal 
slight.  
 Moving forward from Dakar, British-Free French relations were marred by mistrust; De 
Gaulle knew Britain would be quick to sacrifice the Free French if its own interests were 
threatened. De Gaulle struggled to decide whether or not he could work with the British if he 
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believed they would retreat at the first sign of trouble.48 Dakar also underlines the asymmetric 
power dynamic between Churchill and De Gaulle. The British retained all decision-making 
power, in a way only letting De Gaulle tag along. Compounded by the memory of Mers-el-Kébir, 
De Gaulle left Dakar feeling betrayed by the British and determined to strengthen his own forces.  
 
The Free French in Africa 
For several months after Dakar, De Gaulle did not spend much time in London. Admiral 
Cunningham dropped De Gaulle in Douala in October as the British fleet was returning home 
from Freetown. De Gaulle established Free French headquarters in Brazzaville and worked to 
strengthen the Free French Forces. In a telegram to General Ismay for the Prime Minister, the 
General wrote: 
I have completed [a] tour [of] those French African Colonies which have rallied to free France. 
Everywhere I have found nothing but enthusiasm and a (redetermination) [to] fight enemies. 
Many indications have shown me that this feeling shared by great majority population French 
West Africa[.] It is only a really very rigorous repression imposed by Vichy which is able to 
prevent for the time being an explosion of national sentiment…[I have] only one desire which is 
to enable France to play her part again in war and is resolved to welcome all those volunteers who 
are willing and capable furthering this end.49  
Even though they had British support, Africa offered De Gaulle manpower, land, and resources 
that he could use to strengthen the Free French Forces. With Equatorial Africa behind him, 
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autumn 1940 represented a shift in the influence of Free France. De Gaulle was on his way to 
accruing the base he needed in order for Free France to play a larger role in the war; instead of 
just comprising some divisions in the British military, De Gaulle would have his own. 
Specifically, Governor Éboué of Chad was strongly in favor of Free France. His support, along 
with the establishment of headquarters in Brazzaville, gave De Gaulle a solid foundation from 
which to attempt to rally the rest of French Africa.  
Edward Spears was with De Gaulle during this period as well and corresponded with 
officials in London about their activities. His 
messages reflected that De Gaulle became 
increasingly stubborn and rebellious. In one 
note to General Ismay written on October 26, 
Spears wrote that De Gaulle had a “tendency to 
think he is Louis Fourteenth and HMG [His 
Majesty’s Government] the States General may 
be overlooked.”50 In another note just several days later, Spears said that De Gaulle’s attitude “is 
such as to cause some anxiety” because he continued to bypass the British in political affairs; 
Spears said this behavior was “really unpardonable.”51 In one exchange between Major Desmond 
Morton and Spears, Morton wrote:  
You have already recognized whereas De Gaulle’s intentions are beyond reproach his actions in 
the field of international polities might be more effective and less embarrassing to us could he 
enjoy advice [from a] person more experienced in this matter than he is at present.52 
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Spears wrote a journal entry on October 31 that claimed “General De Gaulle seems out of hand 
as far as his communications are concerned. There is no power which can control him in French 
territory…”53 This is a problem for the British: once De Gaulle is in Africa, they no longer have 
any leverage over him. By November 2, Spears was “horrified” by his actions and wrote to 
General Ismay that “Attempt influence him from here [London] has utterly failed. Gather [Col.] 
Williams cannot manage him...Fear of failure lies heavy on him.”54 By the fall of 1940, De 
Gaulle’s lack of political experience became a serious obstacle to the British war efforts. Of 
course, De Gaulle was only concerned with his goals.  
With the defeat of Dakar weighing heavily on him, De Gaulle felt pressure to achieve a 
military victory that would take the rest of Equatorial Africa under his control to establish a 
stronger foothold in Africa. In doing so, he hoped to prove to the British he was, in fact, an 
important ally to have. At the same time, he needed to assert Free France’s ability to act 
independently. When he took Gabon in November, he achieved both of these goals. Free France 
won their first military victory without Britain’s help and it made clear that Free France was 
more than “a handful of mercenaries grouped round a microphone.”55  
As their first joint venture, Operation Menace’s failure revealed that both the interests 
and personalities of De Gaulle and Churchill conflicted. Even though they both wanted to take 
control Africa from Vichy, both their reasons and methods for doing so diverged. The African 
campaign was much more personal for De Gaulle than for Churchill since he wanted those 
territories to support Free France’s leadership. Churchill, on the other hand, simply did not want 
the Germans to have access to the resources and manpower provided by those colonies and cared 
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less about who else was in charge. From De Gaulle’s perspective, it was a personal slight that the 
British did not actively support his leadership in Africa. It also made him suspicious of Britain’s 
true intentions, reigniting the belief that they wanted to take control of France’s African empire 
for themselves.  
De Gaulle was involved in the decision to land at Dakar, an improvement from the role 
he played (or lack thereof) in the decision to sink the fleet at Mers-el-Kébir. He felt immense 
pressure to obstruct the pro-Vichy authorities in Africa and to avoid firing on his fellow 
Frenchmen. If all went well, he hoped the British would see him as important ally in their efforts 
to defeat Germany. Yet, when the mission failed, and the British blamed De Gaulle for it, the 
General’s status among the British seemed to be even more reduced. Left in Africa, De Gaulle 
had to continue climbing his way into a position where the British would finally give him and his 
interests the respect he felt he deserved. The Free French victory in Gabon in November went a 
long way to provide that legitimacy. It was the first win for the Free French and showed that they 
now had support, troops, and territory with which to become a significant player in the war. It 
provided a significant morale boost. As 1940 came to a close, De Gaulle returned to London 
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Chapter 5 – The Levant: 
Following Dakar, the British and Free French had put some distance between themselves. 
The West African campaign had been a humiliating disaster, so each side had taken time after to 
focus on achieving other war aims. De Gaulle had stayed in Africa for several months rallying 
troops and gaining some territory to base Free French operations. Backed by Equatorial Africa, 
especially Félix Éboué in Chad, Free France had finally picked up some momentum in the 
French Empire and became a thorn in the side of Vichy. Back in London, Churchill and the War 
Cabinet had turned their attention to British holdings in the Middle East. Dating back to the end 
of World War I, the British and French had created the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which 
established a mandate system at the Paris Peace Conference and divvied up the region between 
themselves. However, the British viewed the French defeat in June 1940 and the “misfortunes” 
in West Africa from August to December of that year as reason to believe the French could not 
prevent insurrection in the region in the absence of their own forces.1 In an early note from 
Anthony Eden, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to General Wavell, the British 
Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East, Eden comments on the threat to British Palestine 
“which may arise from defections of French in Syria.”2 This reflects how the British worried 
about their ability to maintain their influence in the region for months before the Levant 
campaign was organized.  
By early 1941, British control in the Middle East was noticeably under threat. A coup d’état 
in Iraq in April installed a nationalist government, headed by Rashid Ali, that called for German 
support. Neither Britain nor Free France wanted Germany to entrench itself in the Middle East 
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more than it already had through its influence in Vichy-controlled territories; De Gaulle and 
Churchill each recognized the consequences for their war goals if Iraq fell to the Axis.3 The 
British launched a series of campaigns in the spring to protect their regional influence, including 
in Iraq, Egypt, Greece and Crete. While they triumphed in Iraq, successfully overthrowing the 
Ali government, the Battle of Crete in late May 1941 was another significant and embarrassing 
loss for British. British politician Henry Channon wrote in his diary that “Crete has been a great 
blow” to Churchill. The Prime Minister came under increasing criticism, and Channon remarked 
that “he is undergoing a noticeable slump in popularity and many of his enemies, long silenced 
by his personal popularity, are once more vocal.”4  
Troubles in Iraq raised questions about the situation in Syria and Lebanon. Both were 
part of the French Empire, yet Churchill and De Gaulle had opposing views of how to handle 
them. The British wanted to liberate these territories from French control and offer them 
independence. Churchill hoped that doing so would ensure that the Axis had no direct control 
over their affairs, but would still give the British influence as an ally. Echoing Eden’s rationale 
from nearly a year earlier, Churchill believed that “the French have forfeited all rights in Syria 
since they quitted the League of Nations, and we are entitled to argue that their Mandate has 
lapsed.”5 This underlines how diametrically opposed De Gaulle’s and Churchill’s views on Syria 
were and foreshadows those tensions erupting. Additionally, Churchill remarked several times 
that the British have “no territorial designs in Syria or anywhere else in French territory,” despite 
De Gaulle’s distrust.6 Churchill outlined Britain’s policy in Syria in a correspondence with 
Anthony Eden: 
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It was never our intention that the De Gaullists should virtually step into the places of the Dentz 
administration, or that they should govern Syria in the name of France…They should be given a 
certain prominence in order to show that French interests in Syria are safeguarded against any 
other European Power, and that we have no desire to supplant France in her privileged and 
favored position in Syria. However, all this is but about one to four or five in our Syrian policy, 
which remains the independence of Syria and all its peoples. No French policy which conflicts 
with this major decision can be accepted.7 
It was the position of Britain, then, to push Vichy out in order to prevent the Germans from 
taking control. Once they achieved that, they would make Syria and Lebanon independent states. 
This is, of course, contradictory to British policies towards their own empire, since they really 
only pushed for independence in other people’s colonies.  
By contrast, De Gaulle wanted a Free French occupation of Syria and Lebanon. Georges 
Buis, a captain in the Free French army who served in the Syrian campaign and accompanied De 
Gaulle on his travels around the region in 1941, recalled being in Cairo with de Gaulle. There, he 
said, everyone told him de Gaulle would be welcomed in Syria “’comme un messie, l’armée 
française veut rentrer dans la guerre. This turned out to be “absolumment faux…L’armée était 
entièrement vichyste en Syrie, violemment, beaucoup plus qu’elle ne pouvait l’être en France.”8 
The British feared that occupying these territories would increase the reluctance of the Arab 
world to support the British cause against Germany and Italy. However, de Gaulle viewed the 
British position as a power grab and an attempt to undermine French imperial power, which 
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deeply troubled him.9 He perceived the British in this regard almost like vultures, waiting for 
French rule in the region to collapse before coming in and claiming the remains for themselves. 
Aside from the ideological reasons for wanting to control this territory, the Levant was 
strategically important as well. The Free French were “sorely in need of the Levant’s resources,” 
which included wool, cotton, and silk, the last of which was useful for making parachutes.10  
De Gaulle’s arrogance and stubbornness became more pronounced in the face of what he 
saw as British incursions into French territory. Churchill certainly preferred him to Vichy, but he 
was by no means easy to work with.11 As early as January 1941, the British described how 
difficult De Gaulle had become. Conservative MP Leopold Amery told Edward Spears that De 
Gaulle was “more unwilling than ever to employ English officers” to serve in the Free French 
forces which highlights De Gaulle’s growing fears that Britain was trying to usurp French 
power.12 Georges Buis recalled one story from this period: 
Nous étions à table tous les quatre, De Gaulle, Catroux, Courcel et moi, à Damas, dans cette 
petite résidence, et De Gaulle, comme je vous l’ai dit, ne parlait pas. C’était un moment de sa vie 
où le personnage portait une responsabilité énorme, tâtait ce pays inconnu, les Anglais qui étaient 
nos adversaires, les vichystes, tout était ennemi dans ce coin, et De Gaulle ne se permettait rien, 
au point même qu’il avait refusé de manger dans la salle à manger [de l’hôtel] King David en 
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disant : ‘quand on porte les responsabilités que je porte, on ne dîne pas dans des salles à manger 
où il y a des femmes en peau et de la musique’…Donc il était silencieux.13 
By the summer of that year, as the Levant campaign drew nearer, the British seemed exhausted 
by the General. John Colville wrote that he was “highly-strung and quarrelsome.”14 British 
diplomat Miles Lampson remarked that he and Spears felt “a complete breach was inevitable and 
that our minimum military requirements could not be safeguarded as long as General De Gaulle 
remained leader of Free French.”15 One of the most cutting descriptions of De Gaulle comes 
from Spears himself, who, in a private letter to his wife, wrote that he had “never known him [De 
Gaulle] worse” and that he would “love to lock him up and depose him.”16 
Despite De Gaulle’s difficulty, there was great justification to support his leadership of 
the Levant. Notably, his experience leading troops in Beirut ten years earlier had given the 
General a profound knowledge of the conditions in the Middle East. For eighteen months, he had 
led the 2nd and 3rd Bureaux of the French Army and fought around the region. Compared to his 
time in Africa, where he knew nothing about the continent “that he had not read in a book 
somewhere,” his understanding of the Levant was deeply rooted in personal experience. Jean 
Lacouture writes in his biography of De Gaulle that De Gaulle: 
was acquainted with the chessboard, the pieces and most of the rules of the game; he knew the 
operational bases for the whole of French strategy in this country, the probable allies, the certain 
enemies, the reactions of one set and the reserves of another…At the beginning of 1941 Gaullism 
seemed better qualified than any other for dealing with the problems of the Near East.17 
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15 Sir M. Lampson, Telegram from Cairo to Foreign Office, July 21, 1941, SPRS 8/51, Churchill Archives 
Centre, Cambridge. 
16 Edward Spears, Letter to Nancy Maurice, SPRS 4/2/10/1, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge. 
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So, even though the British did not particularly like working with De Gaulle at this point, there 
was logic to his desire to be involved in the Levant campaign; he felt he had the proper 
experience. 
Georges Catroux was the Free French General on the ground during the Levant 
campaign. He was presented as an alternative to De Gaulle as the leader in the Levant. He led the 
Free French Forces along with General Paul Legentilhomme, but was still subordinate to De 
Gaulle. Catroux had been appointed Governor General of Indochina in fall 1939, but served only 
until July 1940. Following disagreements with the Vichy government, he was forced out of 
office. He decided to join De Gaulle, the highest-ranking French officer to defect to Free France. 
He became De Gaulle’s representative in the Levant. In May 1941, he proposed leading a small 
Free French force to Damascus to cut off the Germans in Crete. He believed they would use the 
small Greek island as a “springboard” to Vichy-controlled Syria and then try and take 
neighboring British Palestine. At first, he was opposed, notably by British General Wavell, the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East.18 However, War Cabinet meetings from late-May 1941 
show that the Prime Minister thought Catroux’s actions to take hold of the Levant should be 
supported “to the best of our ability.”19 On differences between Catroux and De Gaulle, Edward 
Spears’ wife Mary offers an extraordinary commentary worth quoting in its entirety: 
My guess is that we [the British Government] have decided to back Catroux. We probably mean 
by that, in Government circles, merely that we’ve chosen him as the Frenchman most likely to 
bring about some practical measure of unity among the two French factions of De Gaulle and 
Giraud, and are going to build him up for, and support him in, this role. My next guess is that we 
would not be sorry if, in the course of this process of unification, Catroux found it possible and 
                                                        
18 Porch, The Path to Victory, 579. 
19 War Cabinet Defense Committee (Operations), Minutes, Cabinet papers, 69/2, May 20, 1941, in The 
Churchill Documents, 688. 
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advisable to throw over De Gaulle himself. I would even go so far as to imagine that we intend to 
back him more fully than we ever backed De Gaulle in order to make him big enough to do this. 
Therefore, what we really mean in deciding to back Catroux is that we’ve picked him out as the 
one Frenchman who is capable of not only helping us to win that war, but the peace…We say 
Catroux is a good negotiator, a subtle diplomatist, he doesn’t quarrel with anyone (excepting 
always H.M. Minister in Syria)…He has never publicly arraigned Petain, as did De Gaulle; nor 
antagonized the people in France who believe in Petain. He therefore is the one man who can 
perhaps bring order out of French chaos….But finally my guess is that none of this will happen – 
because Catroux, though he would like to, perhaps, will not be able to throw over De Gaulle. If he 
did, he would lose the Fighting French Brigades, and what they stand for as a symbol of 
resistance and honor. De Larminat is De Gaulle’s man, not Catroux…These fighting troops will 
stick to us and to De Gaulle. Catroux has no prestige with them…De Gaulle is their idol. And De 
Gaulle is an abler man than Catroux, and a more courageous. It is he who has kept France alive 
among the Allies. That is why we find him impossible to deal with. It was his business to be 
impossible. And he has accomplished it….For De Gaulle is a man of destiny. A statesman, a 
patriot, a fanatic and a leader. He is made of the stuff of Dictators, and he may just possibly 
become one, be the only one in Europe, when the others have perished.20 
 
The Events 
Churchill wrote to De Gaulle on June 6, 1941, emphasizing the importance of “mutual 
trust and collaboration” in their actions and policies in the Middle East.21 In a letter to President 
Roosevelt from June 7, Churchill remarked that “success depends largely upon the attitude of 
local French troops…I cannot tell how Vichy will react to what may happen.”22 These comments 
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reflect a reality similar to Dakar, in that joint campaigns between the British and Free French 
seemed to take place despite missing information. The desperation they felt for a military victory 
is clear; they were willing to invade Syria without knowing whether or not French troops would, 
if given the opportunity, join Free France. The only way to find out was to move forward with 
the operation. 
Operation Exporter launched 
on June 8, 1941 with the aim of 
ousting Vichy and installing pro-De 
Gaulle authorities. Catroux’s forces, 
led by Generals Wavell and 
Legentilhomme, included 34,000 
troops from Britain, Australia, India, 
and Free French territories.23 They 
attacked from British mandates in 
Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan. 
Vichy brought similar numbers of 
soldiers, although estimates range slightly higher from 35-45,000 troops. However, they carried 
more artillery, including 90 tanks and well-prepared defensive positions.24 On the Allied side, the 
plan called for four lines of invasion: one on Damascus and Beirut from Palestine, two on central 
and northern Syria from Iraq, and the final on northern Lebanon also from Iraq (Figure 1).  
Throughout the campaign, there were ten major land battles that spanned the course of 
June and July 1941. While the Vichy forces had air superiority at the beginning of the campaign, 
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Sullivan__    
 
99 
having more than five times as many aircraft as the British and Free French, they suffered heavy 
losses early on. Most of the Vichy aircraft were lost on the ground, since the flat desert terrain 
made them easily visible targets for British aircraft. On June 21, the British and Free French took 
Damascus, signaling their determination to push Vichy out.  
Fighting continued until July 10, when, as the Australian brigade fighting for Britain was 
about to enter Beirut, Dentz called for an armistice. When the document was signed on July 14, 
Vichy had officially lost the Levant campaign. Operation Exporter improved Britain’s strategic 
position in the Middle East. Most importantly, it halted the possibility of further Axis penetration 
eastward from the Mediterranean, nullifying the advances Germany had made in the 
Mediterranean up to this point. In total, Vichy incurred about 6,000 casualties, compared to 
4,600 on the Allied side, 3,300 of whom were British or from the Commonwealth and the rest 
being Free French.25 
Once Dentz called for the ceasefire, he called a meeting among representatives of Vichy 
and Britain, and one from Free France – Catroux – to discuss an armistice. Neither De Gaulle nor 
Churchill were present, but Churchill’s interests were much better represented because there 
were more British officials present. This disparity helps explain the outcome: on July 14, 1941, 
the Armistice of Saint John of Acre signed over control of the Levant to British troops; Free 
France was not mentioned anywhere in the agreement.26 Edward Spears notes a symbolic 
component of the meeting being held at Acre, writing that it,  
had not been historically a lucky place for France. In Crusader times the Lusignan Kings had had 
to abandon it, and Napoleon had later conceded that the real author of his final defeat had been 
                                                        
25 Porch, The Path to Victory, 581; Upward, “Ordinary Sailors,” 268; Mangold, Britain and the Defeated 
French, 77. 
26 Gaunson, “Churchill, de Gaulle, Spears and the Levant Affair, 1941,” 706.  
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Admiral Sidney Smith whose presence there had prevented his advance on India…[The 
negotiations] seemed to indicate that Acre was still unfavorable to the French.27 
Importantly, the terms of the armistice laid out that Vichy forces were to be repatriated to 
Metropolitan France, which explicitly went 
against what De Gaulle wanted. He had 
planned to absorb those forces into Free 
France. In other words, De Gaulle 
depended on Dentz’s troops changing their 
allegiance.28 In part, this was because 
General Dentz did not recognize the Free 
French as a viable entity; Dentz felt that he 
claimed to represent France. Thus, he was 
told by the Vichy government to only work 
with British officials, who were recognized 
by Vichy as legitimate.29 De Gaulle, on behalf of the Free French, wrote in his memoirs that its 
“substance and form went beyond my worst fears” and that he regarded the agreement “as being 
opposed, in its substance, to the military and political interests of Free France, and as being, in its 
form, extremely painful to our dignity.”30 
While Operation Exporter was a military victory for Britain and Free France, the 
campaign “poisoned” their relations. Catroux’s Chief of Staff, Pierre de Chevigné, called the 
affair “unpleasant.”31 Only one in seven Vichy men defected during the campaign to join Free 
                                                        
27 Edward Spears, “Acre,” March 4, 1971, SPRS 8/51, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge. 
28 Lacouture, De Gaulle, 302; Mangold, Britain and the Defeated French, 131. 
29 Roshwald, Estranged Bedfellows, 79-80. 
30 De Gaulle, The Complete War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle, 189, 193; Berthon, Allies at War, 122.; 
Lacouture, 302. 
31 Fondation et Institute Charles de Gaulle, 78. 
Figure 9: Generals Catroux (left) and de 
Verdilhac (right, Dentz’s Deputy in the 
Levant) at the signing of the Armistice, July 
1941 (Imperial War Musuem, IWM E4131. 
Found in Ball, The Bitter Sea. 
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France and, because the Armistice of Saint John of Acre called for a repatriation of Vichy troops, 
tens of thousands returned to Metropolitan France without even having the option of joining Free 
France. De Gaulle’s prestige declined in unoccupied France, and he was accused of engaging in 
a fratricidal conflict that served British interests.32 These were devastating accusations for a man 
whose sole purpose in life seemed to be defending France. De Gaulle took his deep-seated rage 
out on the British. John Colville, a British civil servant and close friend of Churchill known for 
his detailed diaries, wrote in August 1941 that the General’s attitude “is deplorable and whose 
pronouncements, private and public, are intolerable. The PM is sick to death of him.”33  
 
Reactions 
While Catroux attended the armistice talks as a representative of Charles de Gaulle and 
Free France as a whole, the General was not informed that they were happening; he was in Cairo 
at the time. Sir Miles Lampson sent a telegram to the Foreign Office in London that De Gaulle 
had come to see him on July 21, several days after the armistice was signed. He wrote that De 
Gaulle: 
at once made it clear that he did not regard terms of Armistice as binding upon himself and Free 
French, and he said that they contravened on matter of principle, the terms which he had agreed 
should be put forward…He had worked himself into a state of bitter hostility to everything 
English; he had the appearance of not having slept; and it was impossible to make him see reason 
on any points… he had no confidence in British High Command, who had conducted the 
campaign in an unskillful and dilatory way.34 
                                                        
32 Porch, The Path to Victory, 581; Upward, “Ordinary Sailors, 268; Mangold, Britain and the Defeated 
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33 John Colville,  “Diary,” in The Churchill Documents, 1118. 
34 Sir M. Lampson, “Telegram from Cairo to Foreign Office,” July 21, 1941, SPRS 8/51, Churchill 
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Similarly, Spears remarked that De Gaulle was furious. He said that “it was hardly to be 
expected that he would realize that by now Churchill had concluded that a joint operation with 
him was impossible.”35 To be sure, Spears himself also believed the terms of the armistice were 
unfair to the French. He suggested to De Gaulle that the document at least moved in the direction 
of the joint struggle against Nazism. To this, De Gaulle replied “do you think I want Britain to 
win? No, the only thing that matters to me is a French victory;” when Spears replied that they 
were the same thing, De Gaulle said “not from my point of view; not at all.”36  
These interactions show the extreme frustration and bitter anger De Gaulle felt towards 
the British, but also towards his position in the war. France was time and again silenced by 
powerful Britain. Even when Free France sent Catroux as a representative to the talks, he could 
not compete against bigger, louder and – most importantly – wealthier voices. When the time 
came to decide who controlled the Vichy territories, it was Britain who took them like they were 
tangible property. De Gaulle hated that France appeared so dependent on Britain. He was not 
only distraught that Free France came out on the bottom, yet again, even though the campaign 
was successful; he was also furious that Free France’s partner, Britain, was the reason why. 
Historian Marvin R. Zahniser claims that British attitudes reflected the information circulating 
around the British Foreign Office, in which documents contained “comments demeaning the 
French…[and] snarls of contempt for French defeatists. ”37 
The entire affair brought back to the surface the centuries-old rivalry between Britain and 
France. De Gaulle saw himself as the trustee of France’s vulnerable empire, which he once 
likened to “a ripe cheese, a constant temptation to a hungry appetite;” Britain, then, was 
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famished. Despite Churchill’s constant reassurances that Britain had no interest in accruing 
French territory in the Middle East, De Gaulle unequivocally believed it was British policy to 
“replace France at Damascus and Beirut.”38 Georges Gorse, a professor at a French high school 
in Cairo who met the General in 1941 working with the Free French, recalled that De Gaulle 
referred to the British as “ces cons d’Anglais.”39 
Ultimately, De Gaulle refused to accept the terms agreed upon at Acre. Lampson 
recorded De Gaulle saying the following in a telegram he wrote to the Foreign Office: 
Free France, that is to say France, does not consider itself bound in any manner by the above-
mentioned Armistice Convention and the above-mentioned additional Protocol and reserves to 
itself the right to act accordingly. Free France, that is to say France, does not consent any longer 
to leave to the British Military Command the care of exercising command over French troops in 
the Middle East. General De Gaulle and Council of Defense of French Empire re-assume full and 
entire freedom to dispose of all French armed forces in the Middle East on and from 24th July, 
1941 at noon.40  
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In light of the betrayal Free France felt at the 
hands of Britain, De Gaulle was nearly ready to 
cut ties with Britain, on whom he still heavily 
depended. He basically declared that Free French 
troops were no longer to obey Britain’s military 
command, but to De Gaulle himself.41 Britain’s 
actions regarding the armistice hit harder for De 
Gaulle because he considered it another instance 
where France was betrayed – reminiscent of June 
1940, when France had relied on Britain for military support it did not send in order to protect 
itself. De Gaulle sent Free French representatives to London to fight for their control of the 
Levant and the British eventually backed down when faced with De Gaulle’s “cold fury,”   
leaving Free France to control Syria. However, the conflict in the Levant in spring 1941 ended 
the close relationship between Churchill and De Gaulle. For nearly a year, Churchill refused to 
allow De Gaulle to leave England. At the time of the Syrian crisis, Churchill was meeting 
President Franklin Roosevelt. Episodes like Dakar and Syria had built in Roosevelt a deep, 
nearly irrational dislike of De Gaulle. He later called De Gaulle “unreliable, uncooperative, 
disloyal, and a very dangerous threat to us.”42 In other words, Churchill was moving toward 
Roosevelt, and this meant moving away from De Gaulle. The American entry into the war 
increasingly meant that De Gaulle’s fortuned depended on Roosevelt and not on Churchill. 
                                                        
41 If de Gaulle began independently ordering his troops about in Syria, he would almost certainly have 
found himself in conflict with the British command. Preparations were put in hand to deny de Gaulle 
wireless and telegraph facilities, and, if necessary, to depose him in favor of Catroux (Mangold, Britain 
and the Defeated French, 132; Schoenfeld, The War Ministry of Winston Churchill, 133). 
42 De Gaulle and France, Part 1. 
Figure 10 (L to R): Air Chief Marshal 
Longmore, General Wavell, General de 
Gaulle, and General Catroux 
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The Syria-Lebanon campaign represented a stark turning point in the relationship 
between De Gaulle and Churchill, thereafter complicating their operations throughout the war; it 
was at this point that Churchill went from hero to villain in De Gaulle’s eyes.43 The day before 
the invasion, Churchill had sent De Gaulle a warm and encouraging telegram that emphasized 
the importance of their partnership.44 Yet, this sentiment would change drastically by the end of 
the battle. Understandably, De Gaulle was livid with Churchill after the signing of the Armistice, 
and he made no effort to hide it: 
I don’t think I shall ever get on with Les Anglais…You are all the same, exclusively centered 
upon your own interests and business, quite insensitive to the requirements of others. Do you 
think I am interested in England’s winning the war, I am not—I am interested only in France’s 
victory.45 
Above all, the Levant campaign highlighted Free France’s marginality and the weak position De 
Gaulle had been in – though he tried not to admit it – throughout the entire war.  
Churchill came to the same conclusion that De Gaulle had come to following the 
campaign: “no agreement with him ‘within the ambit of Franco-British collaboration in the 
Levant’ was possible.”46 In a letter to Oliver Lyttelton, a British businessman and politician, 
Churchill wrote:  
any difficulties you have had with De Gaulle are due to his belief that he has me on his side. It is 
true I have always supported him against Catroux, but his recent conduct has affected my 
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relations with him…he will have a lot of leeway to make up before he regains his former position 
in British esteem.47 
Minutes from War Cabinet meetings noted reflected De Gaulle’s “very disturbing” behavior vis-
in the Levant.48 However, Churchill’s main problem with De Gaulle was not just that the French 
General was difficult to work with. Like De Gaulle, Churchill had also felt betrayed during and 
after joint operations.49 Churchill maintained that he offered De Gaulle everything the British 
reasonably could in terms of economic, military, and political support. He felt that De Gaulle’s 
increasing stubbornness and suspicion of British interests ignored the aid he did provide; De 
Gaulle was ungrateful and only interested in serving France. Churchill viewed De Gaulle’s 
dismissal of the British chain of command in the Levant as a sign of disrespect. Both leaders 
personalized their relations with each other, so slights like these felt less like politics and more 
like personal attacks.  
 
Chicago Daily News Interview 
In a Chicago Daily News interview at the end of August 1941, De Gaulle showed just 
how personally he took the outcomes of the Levant events. He belittled Churchill and made him 
look incompetent when he claimed that Britain feared the French fleet. Churchill commented on 
the interview in a note to Lyttelton: “If De Gaulle interview with the American Press at 
Brazzaville is authentic, he has clearly gone off his head. This would be a very good riddance 
and will simplify our further course. De Gaulle has put himself entirely out of court.”50 
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Following news of the interview, Churchill issued “draconian instructions” to his British 
colleagues.51 He forbade English authorities from having any contact with De Gaulle and refused 
to see him himself. Moreover, he denied requests by De Gaulle to broadcast on the BBC until he 
received an explanation for the scandalous interview. Finally, he also instituted a ban on De 
Gaulle leaving Britain, which prevented the General from visiting the Middle East. As one might 
expect, De Gaulle did not take to his “house arrest” well. Of his travel ban, he wrote: “Alors, je 
suis prisonnier.” Moreover, when he asked Churchill if the British intended to exile him to the 
Isle of Man, the Prime Minister replied: “No, for you it will be the Tower of London.” Churchill 
then told Charles Peake, the Foreign Office official in charge of relations with the Free French, 
that he held Peake responsible for ensuring “that the Monster of Hampstead does not escape.”52  
After some time, Churchill agreed to meet with De Gaulle on September 12, 1941 at his 
home in London. In the past, Churchill had usually used his primitive knowledge of French to 
speak directly to De Gaulle, but this time he spoke through an interpreter. By many accounts, 
this was a sign of disrespect for the General. Accounts of the meeting have Churchill beginning 
with: “General de Gaulle, I have asked you to come here this afternoon,” at which point the 
interpreter stepped in. He apparently translated Churchill’s welcome as: “Mon Général, je vous 
ai invité à venir cet après-midi.” As the story goes, Churchill interrupted and corrected the 
interpreter, saying that “I didn’t say Mon Général and I did not say I had invited him.”53  
This moment in the war was the breaking point in Churchill and De Gaulle’s relationship. 
According to historian Peter Mangold, all cooperation was halted, including the suspension of 
intelligence cooperation and Free French broadcasts on the BBC.54 Churchill had “come close to 
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breaking with De Gaulle altogether,” and the affair cemented De Gaulle’s suspicion towards the 
British, claiming that it was Churchill’s policy “to replace France at Damascus and Beirut.”55 De 
Gaulle went even further, claiming in his memoirs that Churchill’s behavior “had been that of an 
adversary.”56 As a result of De Gaulle’s reaction to the Treaty of Acre, Churchill grew more and 
more exasperated with the General, which would poison their mutual relations until the end of 
the war. Ultimately, this conflict did serious damage to Anglo-Free French relations.57  
De Gaulle seemed to shut down and stop cooperating with the British when things did not 
go according to his plan following Operation Exporter. Yet, the disappointment, maddening 
frustration, and betrayal De Gaulle felt following the campaign ran much more deeply than 
would have the simple feeling of not just getting what he wanted. It is yet another example, 
much like the fall of France in June 1940, where the French appeared weak. During the Levant 
campaign, the British had excluded De Gaulle and perhaps even made him appear incompetent. 
They seemed to dismiss De Gaulle’s ability to participate in the political solution in Syria 
because he was hysterical, stubborn, and too concentrated on his own interests.  
De Gaulle’s political defeat at Syria, then, was troublesome precisely because it 
emphasized these perceptions he had hoped to overcome. At the beginning of the operation, De 
Gaulle had believed the Free French and British could, together, push out the Vichy forces and 
regain control of the Levant. Militarily, they did accomplish this. The armistice agreement was 
what betrayed De Gaulle so deeply. Instead of Vichy soldiers being allowed to switch their 
allegiance to Free France, they were repatriated to Europe without even having the option to join 
De Gaulle. The General’s vision had depended on the tens of thousands of Dentz’s men in the 
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Levant to strengthen his own forces, and with the signing of a single document they were gone. 
Moreover, the lackluster number of Vichy defectors during the campaign frustrated De Gaulle as 
well. The nail in the coffin, of course, was that British troops usurped political power without 
any regard for or consultation with De Gaulle.  
Operation Exporter highlights De Gaulle’s complicated experience during the war. For 
Lacouture, De Gaulle’s biographer, Syria “reopened the still-bleeding wound of June 1940.”58 
Major defeats for the Free French came back to back to back: the fall of France in June, Mers-el-
Kébir in July, and Dakar in September. These catastrophes put pressure on Churchill, who as 
Britain’s leader had to take responsibility for his partnership with De Gaulle and the dangers that 
working with him posed to the British, most notably in terms of their resources and reputation. In 
one note to Lord Beaverbrook, Churchill described De Gaulle as “very tiresome.”59 Likewise, De 
Gaulle feared he was one failure away from being cut off from the British completely. Spears 
offered a brief analysis of De Gaulle’s motivations for continuing to fight in 1941: 
I understood and had some sympathy for De Gaulle’s point of view. I realized the gaping wound 
the French defeat had left in his heart…but especially perhaps the personal responsibility he felt 
for keeping the French Empire intact. It is also a fact that the belief had been burnt into his very 
soul since childhood that England had always been the enemy, the real enemy.60  
As much as De Gaulle resented his reliance on his cross-Channel ally, he could not – no matter 
how hard he tried to – deny that he needed them. Regardless of Spears’ expressed sympathy or 
understanding for the General, he still recognized how de Gaulle’s only goal was defending the 
“narrowest French national interests.”61 For a man whose pride was so prominent, admitting his 
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dependence on Britain was almost harder for De Gaulle than coming to terms with the 
occupation of his country.  
As a theater of operations, the Mediterranean was a place where De Gaulle’s Free French 
forces registered important military successes, notably Syria. However, Free France seemed to 
fall short on matching political victories.62 Britain, time and again, came out on top. This is 
understandable given they had the majority of the troops and all of the financial and military 
resources to wage war. It appeared as the war crawled on that the battle for De Gaulle became 
more about containing British efforts to gain a stronger position relative to the French than 
anything else. This fact was especially exacerbated once the Americans entered the war in 
December. Churchill felt that the United States was a more important ally to have and began 
focusing his efforts on fostering that trans-Atlantic relationship. As a result, De Gaulle was 
pushed to the side. Roosevelt could not stand De Gaulle; in one exchange with Churchill, he 
referred to De Gaulle as “our common headache.”63 While the British Foreign Office was 
scratching out France and penciling in the United States as “the United Kingdom’s source of 
salvation and its future partner,” De Gaulle was left feeling abandoned and even more betrayed.64 
The dynamic of the relationship between Churchill and De Gaulle profoundly changed after the 
disappointment of the political outcomes of Syria, but their relationship was profoundly changed 
and effectively demoted once the Americans came onto the scene. De Gaulle was left alone to 
fight for France’s interests in a political climate where the other major players seemed too 
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The fall of France in 1940 was a pivotal moment in the Second World War. Clearly, in 
the European theater it symbolized the spread of the Third Reich further to the West, as well as 
an existential threat to the nearby United Kingdom. It also represented a robust, European 
democracy falling to the totalitarian Germans and removed France from its position as a great 
power. Charles de Gaulle felt the impacts of this defeat personally and sought a partnership with 
Britain to restore the greatness of his country. The relationship that henceforth developed 
between Britain and Free France and between Churchill and De Gaulle, although marked by 
conflicts of both interest and personality, was forged from the common goal of defeating the 
Germans. This thesis has shown how, despite Churchill’s and De Gaulle’s frustrations with each 
other, they continued to work together because of the larger, shared purpose of defeating Hitler. 
Yet, the period between 1940-1941 also saw the erosion of this marriage of convenience between 
de Gaulle and Churchill.  
When de Gaulle first arrived in London in 1940, the two men had great respect for one 
another. Churchill certainly had political incentives for helping de Gaulle push the Germans out 
of France, namely that the proximity of Occupied France endangered Britain, but his admiration 
of de Gaulle inspired him to work with Free France as well. The Mers-el-Kébir incident was the 
first major moment in the war that illustrated how de Gaulle and Churchill had different and 
conflicting goals, specifically that de Gaulle could not preserve the French empire at a time when 
Churchill did not trust his ability to do so. The conflict in the Levant was a much larger 
illustration Free French-British tension because Churchill was actively trying to expand into the 
Levant. In the end, the territory was ceded to the British after negotiations in the Saint John of 
Acre Armistice. Vichy hosted these talks, but de Gaulle was not present and Free France as a 
whole was seriously underrepresented. The Dakar incident, on the other hand, was not so much a 
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conflict over territorial control as it was a major embarrassment. Free French forces failed to 
capture this port from Vichy, which damaged de Gaulle’s standing with the British. Thus, from 
Mers-el-Kébir in July 1940 to the Saint John of Acre Armistice in the Levant in July 1941, 
Churchill and de Gaulle’s relationship changed from one of respect and admiration to one of 
frustration and opposing goals.  
After the Americans entered the war in 1941, much of this dynamic between Churchill 
and de Gaulle and Britain and Free France had changed. President Roosevelt despised de Gaulle 
and did what he could to avoid working with the General directly. Moreover, because Roosevelt 
assumed leadership of the Allies, replacing Churchill, he excluded de Gaulle from major plans, 
such as the invasion of Madagascar, the Operation Torch Landings in North Africa in 1942, and 
the Yalta Conference in 1945. In the 1943 Casablanca Conference, de Gaulle attended but was 
left out of all decision making processes.  At the same time, it can be argued that the historical 
force and wisdom of De Gaulle’s stubbornness paid off when, in 1944, Roosevelt acceded to 
allowing the General to dominate Liberated France. Even the American President had to 
recognize how De Gaulle had effectively made himself the unquestioned leader of Resisting 
France, both inside and outside the country.  
Personality was certainly not the only factor that played a role in the tumultuous relations 
between Britain and Free France, but it did create tension. This thesis has made an implicit 
argument that if either de Gaulle or Churchill had been replaced by another leader, these early 
moments in the war may have played out differently. In the end, this relationship was successful 
for both Britain and France, most obviously because they won the war. Moreover, de Gaulle’s 
leadership of the Free France played a large part in France’s liberation and was one reason of 
many explaining his importance in French history. De Gaulle’s accomplishments after the war 
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and the entire course of French history since was thus dependent on the relationship de Gaulle 
forged with Churchill in June 1940.   
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